DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM)

MIGRATION FLOWS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN TOWARDS EUROPE.
UNDERSTANDING DATA-GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

DESK REVIEW REPORT
August 2016
International Organization for Migration
Geneva, Switzerland
August 2016

Migration flows from Afghanistan and Pakistan towards Europe. Understanding data gaps and recommendations.

This desk review report is the output of the first phase of IOM’s project implementation on data collection to enable a better understanding of migration flows from Afghanistan and Pakistan towards Europe, a collaborative effort by DTM support team and relevant IOM field missions. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

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INTRODUCTION

The number of arrivals by sea and land to Europe for 2015 exceeded one million on the 20th December, with the total number registered by the relevant national authorities standing at 1,046,599 according to IOM’s DTM\(^1\) system in coordination with relevant IOM missions and national authority partners. Of these, 20.2 percent were Afghans whilst 2.7 percent were Pakistani nationals. In data from January to the end of May 2016, the cumulative total of 220,796 arrivals included 19.5 percent Afghan and 3 percent Pakistani nationals.

The sharp increase in violence in Afghanistan has intensified the flow of Afghan (forced) migrants during the past year. About three in four Afghans have experienced forced displacement at some point in their life, and many have experienced multiple displacements (both internal and external) (Schmeidl, 2014). Internal displacement and migration are intertwined in Afghanistan, with Kabul and other large regional cities receiving an increasing number of people from other conflict affected areas.

In Pakistan, as of July 2015, there were more than 1.8 million people displaced by insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence (IDMC, 2015). In addition to violence, disasters induced by natural hazards have also played a major role in forced migration. Monsoon rains and earthquakes have caused the displacement of 14.57 million people across wide areas of the country since 2010 (IDMC, 2015).

Drawing upon the current Afghan and Pakistani migration context, DTM is implementing a project that focuses on information and data gathering to enhance the understanding of current migration flows from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe. This project particularly aims to collect information and data on forced and irregular migrants\(^2\) from Afghanistan and Pakistan and their migration through the Middle East towards Europe whilst gathering information in eight thematic areas: 1) migrant profile, 2) migration routes and trajectories, 3) resourcing the journey, 4) role of intermediaries, 5) vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries, 6) migration drives and decision making, 7) role of the diaspora (incl. remittances) and 8) migrant’s perceptions towards Europe.

\(^1\) The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system to track and monitor the displacement and population mobility. It is designed to regularly and systematically capture, process and disseminate information to provide a better understanding of the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations, whether on site or en route. http://www.globaldtm.info http://migration.iom.int/europe

\(^2\) The term migrant is used throughout this report as a catch all term to include refugees fleeing individual persecution, people fleeing conflict and wider instability, people migrating for socio-economic purposes and other Afghan and Pakistani migrants travelling by irregular/non-formal means.
THEMATIC AREAS

1. Migrant profiles
2. Migration routes and trajectories
3. Resourcing the journey
4. Role of intermediaries
5. Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries
6. Migration drivers and decision making
7. Role of the diaspora
8. Migrant’s perceptions towards Europe

The project is one component of a comprehensive data collection and migration monitoring exercise being undertaken across Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The project will produce a comprehensive analysis of key characteristics of migration patterns, which will inform humanitarian stakeholders and enable better targeted responses and programming in concerned countries. Under the first phase of this project, DTM has initiated and completed a desk review exercise to review existing information and data. The core findings of the desk review exercise are presented in this report that aims to draw a basic situation analysis and identify data gaps.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Conceptual framework

This section outlines a summary of the conceptual framework that provides the foundation for the formulation, interpretation and analysis of the research questions, relevant sources and thus the framing of the answers provided.

The research is grounded in a conceptual framework that aims to go beyond the narrow economic functionalism to analyse the central role of individual choice, agency and deviation and examine the interaction of individual choice and decision-making taking into account the structural factors. Traditionally, migration was examined through a functionalist approach that sought to explain the rational choice of individuals when faced with specific threats and opportunities. Today, research has shown that the individual’s choice must be placed within the applicable contextual and structural factors that include gender and age of the individual, household and intergenerational dynamics, transnational networks, history and culture of migration, political economy analyses, migration institutions and policies. Furthermore, these factors may interact in a complex manner, vary over time and over the trajectory of the journey. The implications of this conceptual framework for each research question will be further elaborated below under the identified thematic areas.

2.2 Methodology

The following stages were undertaken as the methodology for Phase I of the desk review report:

2.2.1 Defining thematic areas and conceptual implications

The research questions were finalised as part of the proposal submission process and were therefore not amended during the compilation of the desk review. However, while reviewing the questions, it was found that several questions involved a range of concepts and actors that overlapped between areas as well as certain sub questions were found to deserve distinct, further research. In order to increase clarity and to follow a structured approach, the team therefore divided the research questions into eight thematic areas. These areas are elaborated on in greater detail below, together with a summary of the relevant considerations drawn from the overall conceptual framework mentioned above.
Migrant profiles

The conceptual framework relevant to an investigation of the profiles of Afghan and Pakistani migrants to Europe acknowledges the diverse experiences of individuals and groups depending on social and cultural factors. It recognises that experiences and practices of migration are deeply influenced by the social and cultural constructions of gender and age interacting with the expectations on individuals to migrate: several studies detail how migration interacts with ideas of masculinity, ‘coming of age’ and the ability for individuals to fulfil culturally constructed gender roles and obligations. Age interacts with migration policies in a way that for example, younger sons may be send on ahead by the family due to perceptions that they will be more likely to be granted asylum, while the elderly are less likely to be able to make the journey.

Furthermore, intra-household dynamics have valuable impacts depending on the sociocultural context – for example, cultural practices around inheritance, livelihoods and care for the elder may influence whether firstborns or younger sons/daughters tend to migrate. Class dynamics are also applicable: the ability and likelihood of an individual to migrate are strongly affected by the resources and capital available to them. Ethnicity, religion and culture are crucial in providing the basis for transnational linkages, network formations and historical narratives that influence decision-makings to migrate, routes taken and the sources of support.

At the same time when creating so called migrant profiles of Afghans and Pakistani migrants on their way to Europe, the categorisation of these migrant ‘profiles’ should be critically examined, particularly categories including asylum seeker, refugee, illegal/irregular migrant, labour migrant, international student, trafficking victim, tourist, and expatriate. These categories are mentioned here because many of them contain instrumental and political constructions that involve the ‘production of illegality’ through policies of inclusion and exclusion.

Migration routes and trajectories

The conceptual framework used for investigating migration routes and trajectories of Afghan and Pakistani migrants towards Europe recognises that journeys are often erroneously characterized as linear and direct progressions from origin to destination, whereas in fact the concepts of origin, transit and destination must themselves be problematized to a certain extent. Many international migrants have previously experienced displacement or migration within or across their borders. Trajectories may often be circular, multidirectional, repetitive or interrupted, with long phases of immobility and short phases of mobility. The assumption of linearity may underestimate the role of decision-making en route and the adaptation,
flexibility and response to obstacles that characterise most journeys (Townsend & Oomen, 2015; Innes, 2015). The role of coincidental encounters often influence migrants’ trajectories, with the likelihood of influence varying according to the social environment and the personal characteristics of the migrant (Gladkova & Mazzucato, 2015). Trajectories must also be placed within their historical and cultural context: many tend to follow historical trade routes and have their roots in linkages influenced by colonialism, development projects or political, ethnic or religious links. Next to origin and destination countries, transit countries are of major importance within the trajectory of a migrant. ‘Transit’ countries of migration are particularly problematic concepts, often used by states as instruments wishing to justify the lack of asylum provision or durable solutions within their borders (Collyer, Düvell, & de Haas, 2012). Research often focuses on migrants in the ‘destination’ country, introducing bias by selecting only those who managed to reach it (Townsend & Oomen, 2015). Also, migration may be an ongoing, life-long process and it is therefore difficult to claim whether anyone has ever reached his or her final ‘destination’ (Monsutti, 2008).

Resourcing the journey

The conceptual framework regarding the resourcing and financing of migration journeys recognises the wide range of resources that can be mobilised and exploited in order to continue the journey, as well as the impact of class and other factors on the availability of such resources. Resources or capital are not merely financial but can also be of social and cultural nature – in fact, poorer households may have to rely more heavily on social and cultural capital such as networks in order to compensate for their lack of financial resources (Van Hear, 2006). Migration requires the accumulation or possession of amounts of capital in various combinations including economic, cultural/informational and social/human capital. Different destinations require different amounts, forms and combinations of capital, influencing the migrant’s ability to migrate and their trajectories (ibid). The question of resources and capital therefore links closely into the role of intermediaries discussed in the next section, as well as to the thematic area concerned with the diaspora engagement and remittances. The question of how migrants finance their migration journey is most often interlinked with the topic of loans and indebtedness as their source of economic capital for migration. Connected to this is also the system of loan repayment, which is based upon future earnings and links this thematic area to the concepts of voluntary and involuntary migration in the smuggling versus trafficking debate that is however not extensively covered in this review.

The role of intermediaries

The role, identity, organization and behaviour of the intermediaries are investigated within a conceptual framework that acknowledges a wide variety of actors who interact with the migrants along their migration
trajectory. A historical perspective helps to illuminate the fact that practices of brokering and facilitating migration began in the colonial period or even before, and that the demand for brokering and the services of intermediaries are most often ‘produced’ by the increasing quantity and complexity of immigration requirements (Ahmad, 2014). Migration routes developed along historic trade routes such as the Grand Trunk Road and the Silk route. Agents base themselves in ancient trade cities, learning local languages and developing relationships with other intermediaries including border guards, immigration officials and owners of small hotels (ibid).

The used conceptual framework rejects simplistic binaries of smuggling vs. trafficking, recognising a complex spectrum of motivations, experiences and levels of consent and exploitation within migration trajectories. A sub altered, migrant-focused perspective encompasses all those who come in contact with the migrant and may alternatively facilitate, obstruct, assist or negotiate with the migrant en route. Such actors potentially include guides, ‘cashiers’, money lenders, travel agents, recruitment actors, passport and visa forgers, taxi and lorry drivers, border guards, airport officials, hostel operators and even aid workers, church groups, migrant associations and volunteers seeking to assist migrants. While the organization of such intermediaries remains under-investigated, many sources point to the relevance and application of network theory which claims that migrants often migrate to places where there is already a network of people from the same origin as well as it include the affinity of the intermediary to the migrant.

As already pointed out, closely contented to the topic of intermediaries is also the business of trafficking and other illegal activities. Some sources use a security and state-centric approach to connect and equate human smuggling with organized crime and even terrorism, as well as projecting a highly organised, centralised and controlled operation (Dimovski, Babanoski, & Ilijevski, 2013; Vreja, 2007). Most sources, however, indicate that a more accurate model is one of loose, inter-connected networks that respond to the changing context in a fluid and dynamic manner, with specialised functions and services provided by clusters of actors who are often linked by ethnic or nationality ties, and who may often recruit and include migrants themselves or migrants’ kinship networks (ibid).

A political economy perspective is also informative in a way that it often presents smuggling and migration as a business, with discrete functions including mobilisation, support en route, and integration (Salt & Stein, 1997). Services offered by these intermediaries vary and have been grouped by one influential source into three categories, namely, (i) individual smuggling with a high degree of independence, using smugglers only for border crossing; (ii) visa smuggling as a service providing false documents to travel through formal channels; and (iii) pre-organised, stage-to-stage smuggling, often entailing ethnic linkages and
interconnected networks (Neske & Doomernik, 2006). The political economy approach also allows investigation into the demand and supply dynamics of smuggling, presenting people smuggling as a transnational service industry, and a market activity with peculiarities stemming from its illegality. One source draws the conclusion that imperfect information drives down the price of the smuggling services offered, as people lack the information to choose between better and worse services. The lowering of prices leads to a general drop in service quality, which some intermediaries attempt to counteract by offering warranties, guarantees and information (Bilger, Hofmann, & Jandl, 2006).

Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries
The conceptual framework for examining the vulnerability factor of migrants along the migration trajectory recognises that vulnerability varies according to specific characteristics and experiences of the migrant. Age, gender, sexuality, resources, class, ethnicity and other factors interact with the contextual and structural factors to increase or reduce vulnerability in specific ways. The migrant’s agency, adaptability and resilience must also be factored in. Migrants are not passive, vulnerable actors but active participants in the process, often learning skills en route, making strategic and tactical decisions, solving problems, negotiating and combating obstacles, and manipulating procedures and policies. Analysis of migrant decision-making should seek to evaluate the risks, benefits and opportunities from the migrants’ perspective, which itself is influenced by personal history and socio-cultural factors. A critical approach should also recognise that vulnerability is often aggravated or even produced by state policies and practices as well as by the global political economy. The production of ‘illegality’ means that the poorest pay the most to travel and must travel in the most dangerous way (Ahmad, 2014).

Drivers of migration and decision-making
Rather than just focusing narrowly on rationalist, economic ‘push and pull’ factors operating on the individual migrant, an understanding of the nature of drivers of migration and process of decision-making must locate the role of individual agency and decision-making within the wider constraining or enabling structure and context. Flows of Afghans, Pakistanis and other migrants are strongly influenced by the history and culture of migration from and to the relevant countries, and this history must again be considered at the national, local, community and household levels: migration ‘histories’ vary significantly between families, ethnic groups, locations and countries. Household dynamics and culture may determine to what extent a decision to migrate is made individually or collectively, and what importance is attached to the individual’s own wishes. As mentioned earlier, availability of social, cultural and economic capital,
resources, linkages and information have a strong impact on the range of choices and possibilities available (Robinson & Segrott, 2002; Rüegger & Bohnet, 2015; Rechitsky, 2014). Cultural and historical factors may lead to migration being perceived as a normal phase of life, connected to ideas of masculinity, ‘coming of age’ and contributing to the household.

Equally important are past, current and projected political and economic factors as well as globalisation trends affecting communication, transnational networks (including the diaspora, intermediaries and border policing authorities) and state migration policies (Boyd, 1989). Rather than an attempt to weight and quantify push and pull factors against the assumption of immobility at the start of the journey, this conceptual framework aims to consider background or contextual motivations as well as specific triggering events, while acknowledging that such motivations will likely evolve over the potentially transformative experience of the journey (Townsend & Oomen, 2015). Another useful framework for considering decision-making is the concept of ‘migration thresholds’, which posits three separate thresholds that are overcome in the decision to migrate: the indifference threshold (whether to migrate), the locational threshold (where to migrate) and the trajectory threshold (how to migrate) (Van der Velde & Van Naerssen, 2011).

The role of the diaspora (incl. remittances)

A lot of the literature on Diaspora focuses on integration and acculturation in the country of destination, or on the diaspora’s role in developing their country of origin. These areas are however not directly relevant to this research study. The concept of chain migration provides a framework to examine how the diaspora works to facilitate and support increased migration, particularly through kinship marriages, family reunification and the impact of a diaspora presence on perceptions of similarities of culture, religion and availability of support. The concept of diaspora is, however, often too narrow and focuses only on ‘sending countries’ vs ‘receiving countries’. A more useful framework highlights emerging, growing and adapting transnational communities, linking to the role of intermediaries and encompassing network linkages along the migration trajectory.

Similarly, remittances should be viewed within their social and relational context, rather than a purely economic focus on amounts sent and received. Flows are influenced by political factors, relationships, individuals’ status and identity in relation to the household and the wider community, religious practices of charity such as zakat, and cultural practices including dowries. Remittances are only one component of the complex relations of friendship, love, support, obligation and duty between actors. Decisions about how remittances are allocated and spent are influenced both by intra-household dynamics and by the social
and political climate: several studies have shown that receiving households’ ability to use and invest such remittances is often severely constrained by lack of services and infrastructure as well as class issues (Ballard, 2003; De Haas, 2005).

**Migrants’ perceptions towards Europe**

As mentioned above, the conceptual framework relevant to this thematic area acknowledges the non-linear and evolving nature of the migration trajectory and the complexity of decision-making involved in deciding to migrate. Contrary to European media that often claim that migrants choose destination countries in order to exploit and benefit from generous asylum and welfare systems, most studies reveal that there is a wide variety of migrant knowledge, perceptions and experiences. In many cases destination choices are determined either by availability of resources and capital, collective family decisions or the operation of intermediary services and networks. In many other cases, choices of destination are made en route and evolve over time in response to new information and obstacles or facilitation encountered along the way.

### 2.2.2 Setting the criteria for inclusion and exclusion

A thorough literature review related to irregular migration of Afghan and Pakistani nationals to Europe was conducted. Literature was considered relevant if it contained information within the scope of one of the eight thematic areas and concerned either Pakistani or Afghan nationals (or both), indifferent to where their journey started. While the study maintained a primary focus on the migration flows of Afghans and Pakistanis in Pakistan (in the case of Afghans), Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, other countries were not expressly excluded to avoid pre-determining routes and allow comparisons to be drawn with other major migration flows (for example, Pakistani nationals to the Gulf countries).

Internal displacement of Afghans in Afghanistan and Pakistanis in Pakistan as a result of both conflict and natural disasters poses a challenge to the research study, having clear linkages to outward migration while existing on a scale significantly beyond and apart from outward migration. At the desk review stage, the team focused its efforts on outward migration, investigating internal displacement as an indirect component of the relevant thematic areas including drivers of migration and migration trajectory.

The team included studies using quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method approaches from academic, grey literature and data published on government websites and reports from official government and non-
governmental organisations. A broad approach to the inclusion of types of sources was followed, as many of the changes in migration flows are very recent and have not yet been captured in academic research. When studies were available that addressed the thematic areas but did not specifically address Afghan and Pakistani nationals, but could reasonably be assumed as applicable (for example, investigations of vulnerabilities of other migrant nationalities in Greece and Turkey), they were included as far as they were useful. The reliability and quality of the sources were considered as part of the evidence assessment, with those not meeting minimum standards of quality being rejected. The sources were all in English language and most were published between 2000 and 2016.

2.2.3 Selection of sources

Stakeholder surveys
In order to support secondary data collection activities and to prepare the design of data collection for the next phase, IOM gathered preliminary data, information, and observations from relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan and Pakistan through a stakeholder survey. This survey was designed to further define effective primary data collection tools, avoid redundancy, and create synergies where possible.

Stakeholders (mainly working for national governments and humanitarian and development organizations) were asked to complete a total of ten open-ended questions. After completion of the stakeholder surveys all information was compiled in one data-sheet and specific answers were linked to each of the eight thematic areas. Secondary sources identified by the stakeholders were entered into the secondary data gathering exercise outlined below.

Primary data gathering
As part of the DTM implementation, IOM has operated a flow monitoring system (FMS) in different countries throughout Europe since 2015. This system includes primary data collection through surveys at flow monitoring points across the transit countries in Europe and regular data consolidation and analysis exercises. Through this system, IOM has already interviewed a total of 9,805 migrant individuals up to end of June 2016, from which, 2,370 are Afghans and 299 are Pakistani nationals. This data is also used in the desk review analysis and will support the design of the data collection to be completed under the follow-up phases of the DTM project.
**Secondary data gathering: Definition of search terms**

The selection of sources was carried out with extensive searches on Google Scholar. The table below shows the search terms used per thematic area, using the research questions and inclusion/exclusion criteria as a guide:

**Table 1 - Search terms used per thematic area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Migrant profiles</th>
<th>2. Migration routes and trajectories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani migrants (refugees; asylum seekers) to (in) Europe</td>
<td>Migration routes to Europe/Turkey/Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan migrants (refugees; asylum seekers) to (in) Europe</td>
<td>Migrants/refugees/asylum seekers Bulgaria/Hungary/Croatia/France/Germany/UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic profile Pakistani/Afghan migrant</td>
<td>Pakistani/Afghan migrants travel to Europe/EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic profile Pakistani/Afghan migrant</td>
<td>(Irregular/unofficial/illegal) Border crossings Afghanistan/Balochistan/Pakistan/Iran/Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani/Afghan migrant ethnic/religious persecution/discrimination</td>
<td>Migration/smugglers hub/transit point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Unaccompanied) minors Afghan Pakistani Europe/Turkey/Iran</td>
<td>Afghan migrants/asylum seekers/refugees in Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani/Afghan migrant profiles/profiling/arrivals</td>
<td>Transit countries/routes to Europe/EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed migration routes Afghanistan/Pakistan/Iran/Turkey/Europe/EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Resourcing the journey</th>
<th>4. The role of intermediaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants finance journey Pakistani Afghanani</td>
<td>Smugglers Europe EU Afghan Pakistani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration debts Pakistani Afghanani</td>
<td>Smuggling/Traffickers Europe/Turkey/Greece/Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants sale of property Pakistani Afghanani</td>
<td>Smuggler destination choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants source of funds</td>
<td>Smuggler abuse exploitation Europe Afghan Pakistani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants hawala Pakistani Afghanani</td>
<td>Smuggler protection network ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants working as smugglers Pakistani Afghanani</td>
<td>Smuggling/trafficker network Afghanistan/Pakistan/Turkey/Iran/Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as investment Pakistan Afghanan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries

Migrants abuse/ exploitation/ border guards/ sexual abuse/ rape/ transit/ Europe/ Turkey/ Iran/ Greece/ Hungary/ Bulgaria/ Croatia

Europe camp conditions hot spots

Europe stranded migrants

Turkey migrants asylum seekers returned deported

Refugee/asylum seeker women/ children Europe/ EU

Unaccompanied (minor/ children) shelter asylum seeker protection risk

Detention migrant asylum seeker

6. Drivers of migration and decision making

Destination choice migration Europe Afghan Pakistani

Transit countries destination choice Europe Afghan Pakistani Turkey Iran

Economic conditions migration Afghan Pakistani Iran

Conditions destination country host country migration choice

Drivers of migration push pull Pakistani Afghan Europe

Migration motivations decision making factors Pakistani Afghan Europe EU

Motives for migration Pakistani Afghan

7. The role of the diaspora and remittances

Pakistan/ Afghanistan remittances Europe/ UK

Diaspora linkages facilitation chain migration

Kinship community links migration migrants

Investment remittances Afghanistan Pakistan

8. Migrants’ perceptions towards Europe

Migrant perception Europe

Migrant knowledge asylum procedures policy Europe

Expectations reality migrant perceptions Europe

Migration information campaigns

Screening of sources for relevance

Available sources on the topic were screened for relevance to the eight thematic areas. The criteria that were used in order to evaluate in which thematic areas the source fits, were the following:

1. Does the source provide information about profiles of Afghan or Pakistani nationals potentially, currently or previously migrating to Europe?

2. Does the source provide information about the routes, border crossing points, transit points, hubs, modalities, costs, length of journey or documentation involved in migration of Afghan or Pakistani nationals towards Europe?
3. Does the source provide information on how Afghan and Pakistani nationals finance their migration journeys towards Europe, how these payments are made and enforced in terms of modalities, conditions, phases or information about loans and indebtedness resulting from migration journeys?

4. Does the source provide information on the role, identity, actions, networks, migrant perceptions, organisation, abuses by or linkages to criminal activity of intermediaries and actors during the migration journeys of Afghan and Pakistani nationals towards Europe whether in the source country, transit countries or destination countries?

5. Does the source provide information on risks, abuse and vulnerabilities faced and/or mitigation and coping strategies employed by Afghan or Pakistani migrants en route to Europe whether in the source country following the decision to leave but prior to exiting the country, in transit countries or destination countries?

6. Does the source provide information on motivations or triggering events leading Afghan or Pakistani migrants to leave their country of residence, motivations to migrate in general, motivations to migrate to Europe in general or motivations to migrate to a specific European country?

7. Does the source provide information on the role of the Afghan or Pakistani diaspora and transnational networks in motivating, financing, facilitating or in any other way playing a role in the migration of Afghans or Pakistanis to Europe? Does the source provide information on the transfers and use of remittances by migrants or migrant families in Afghanistan or Pakistan?

8. Does the source provide information on the perception of Afghan or Pakistani migrants of countries in Europe or Europe in general including asylum procedures, rights of asylum, available support, right to work, socioeconomic conditions and risks/vulnerabilities faced en route or at the destination?

Based on the application of these screening criteria, literature on several topics was excluded including:

- Migration and security or terrorism
- Migration governance, regulation and management
- Readmission policies and procedures
- Detention systems and policies
- Migration policy and its evolution
- Border management structures, strategies and policies
- Refugee return programmes to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran
- Integration, acculturation and social cohesion in destination countries
- Economic impact of migration on destination countries
- Counter trafficking legislation
- Operation of the Dublin Protocol and burden sharing policy and practice
- European perceptions of migrants

In total, 329 sources of secondary data were screened, and 117 were accepted on the basis of their relevance and meeting a minimum level of quality. Of these, 37 were relevant to Afghan nationals only, 14 were relevant to Pakistani nationals only, 53 were relevant to both Afghan and Pakistani nationals and 13 were accepted although they did not directly relate to Afghan or Pakistani migrants.

2.2.4 Assessment of data for quality and coherence

The available data was categorised according to the type of literature (organization research report, situation report, academic thesis (PhD or DPhil only), and journal article) and the type of data included (literature review, data compilation, qualitative research, quantitative research or mixed methods). Together, these factors together with the credentials of the author, publisher or organization were combined to provide a quality score entered for each source.

The data was given a score for its relevance ranging between 1 and 3, based on:

1. The data may contribute towards answering the question but is limited, incomplete or only a minor focus of the report
2. A significant proportion of the data is directly relevant to answering the question
3. Data has been gathered and analysed to specifically address the questions posed.

The relevance score also took into account the date that the data was gathered – for some thematic areas this was highly relevant while for others less so.

Each document was scored for strength of agreement according to whether it has:

1. Research gap: The findings represent an element on which there is a lack of evidence within the literature.
2. Mixed agreement: There is no clear and conclusive agreement on these findings
3. Strong agreement: Represents findings confirmed by multiple sources

The table below summarises the number of documents and their average scoring per thematic area. Many sources contained data relevant to more than one thematic areas. Full details and scoring for documents selected for final analysis were included in the literature overview sheet attached as Annex III.

Table 2 - Number of documents and their average scoring per thematic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Area</th>
<th>Number of sources</th>
<th>Average relevance</th>
<th>Average quality</th>
<th>Average agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Profile</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Routes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Resourcing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Intermediaries</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Drivers</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Diaspora and remittances</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Perceptions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.5 Presentation and analysis

All data was reviewed and conclusions and comparisons were drawn whenever possible. Selections of most important and relevant findings were summarized under each thematic area. During the final stages of the desk review, data gaps were identified for each thematic area and these data gaps were compared across each other. After a brief background and historical context on the nature and drivers of migration inside and outward from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the findings of the desk review are summarized per thematic area in section 5. Drawing upon these findings, a general conclusion is outlined in section 6.
3. BACKGROUND SUMMARY: NATURE AND THE DRIVERS OF MIGRATION INSIDE AND OUT OF AFGHANISTAN (1978-DATE)

Following Kushminder’s and Dora’s study (2009), as well as the IOM migration profile on Afghanistan (2014) the modern history of Afghanistan can be divided into four main phases: pre-1978, 1978 to 1992, 1992-2001 and 2002 to date.

Pre-1978

Afghanistan was founded as a state under Ahmed Shah Durrani in 1774. During the ‘Great Game’ period of contestation between the British and Russian empires, Afghanistan was ruled by a monarchy and indirectly by the British rule, treated by both superpowers as a buffer zone. As a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state along the Silk Route, Afghanistan has a long history of migration for trade, livelihoods, pilgrimage and escaping conflict. Transnational networks and migration between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran have been a reality for many years. The Hazara ethnic group have a particularly long migratory history linked to their adherence to the Shi’ite sect and religious ties to Iran as well as their traditional livelihoods (Robson & Lipson, 2002). The Pashtun ethnic group is divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan by the Durand Line border between the two countries and cross-border movement is a daily reality in this region (Monsutti, 2006).

Afghanistan’s poor economic status, underdevelopment, droughts, crop failures and the relative lack of industrialisation led to significant migration to the comparatively more developed neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Iran during the 1960s and 1970s. The 1970s and 1980s oil boom in the Gulf States also drew Afghans to the Middle East via Iran (Stigter, 2006). The last king, Zahir Shah was overthrown in a coup d’etat by President Mohammed Daoud in 1973, which was then again overthrown by the Soviet-supported and Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978.

1978-1992: Afghanistan occupation by the Soviet Union

During the soviet occupation, in an attempt to oust the occupants from the Soviet Union, the US funded, trained and equipped insurgent forces, the *muhajedeen*, primarily through the US presence in Pakistan. After a decay of occupation by the Soviet Union and ongoing battles with insurgent forces the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989.
This war caused unprecedented internal displacement and a new wave of refugee flows out of Afghanistan, primarily to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Refugees fled the conflict as well as the effects of the conflict, such as collapse of basic services, the destruction of infrastructure, further decline in economic opportunities and lack of security. An estimated two million individuals were internally displaced between 1985 and 1992 (UNHCR, 2009). Refugee flows peaked during the 1990 drought following the Soviet troops withdrawal at around 6.2 million refugees evenly split between Pakistan and Iran (Wickramasekara, et al., 2006).

1992-2001: Taliban rule

The failure to create a new government following the departure of the Soviets troops led to civil war between 1992 and 1996. Despite the unrest, by 1997 an estimated 4 million refugees had returned, with 2.8 million remaining in Pakistan and Iran. According to UNHCR, the number of internally displaced people fluctuated but increased from 500,000 and 1.2 million between 1994 and 2001. The Taliban emerged and restored order through the imposition of Shari’a law, importing the Salafist ideologies from Saudi Arabia. While the Taliban controlled most of the new ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ by 1998, the Northern Alliance maintained an opposition government of the ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’. The Taliban regime was accused of a number of international law and human rights violations including executions, widespread sexual abuse and ethnic cleansing, as well as harbouring Osama Bin Laden, who was linked to several high profile terrorist attacks against American interests. Net refugee populations outside Afghanistan began to climb again in 1999 to reach 3.8 million in 2001, with 2.2 million in Pakistan and 1.6 million in Iran. Asylum applications by Afghans in Europe grew steadily from 8,542 in 1991 to 12,943 in 1997, then escalating to reach a peak of 50,946 in 2001 (Cibea, et al., 2014).

Post 2001: US invasion

Following the attack on the World Trade Centres in New York and other attacks on 11 September 2001, the US and Coalition Forces invaded Afghanistan and claimed defeat of the Taliban rule by the end of the year. The International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) controlled by NATO took over the task of maintaining security across the country. The UN-led interim government was established in December 2001. President Hamid Karzai was elected in the first democratic elections in 2004 and re-elected in 2009.
Despite over US$286.4 billion in development aid, security and military resources between 2002 and 2009, the Afghan government struggled to retain control, and the Taliban began to resurge in 2005 (Poole, 2011). In 2011, 58.8 percent of the country was assessed as living in multidimensional poverty and in 2015, Afghanistan ranked 171 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2011, 2015). In 2014, President Ashraf Ghani was elected and the ISAF troop withdrawal and handover began, leaving the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain order and combat the continuing threat of terrorism and violence. By 2014 insurgent extremist groups had de facto gained control of significant portions of the south and east of the country. Ethnic and religious minorities continued to be specifically targeted and discriminated against. Over 11,000 civilians were killed or injured in Afghanistan in 2015, the highest rate of civilian casualties since the invasion by US forces in 2001 (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2015).

Refugee and internal displacement flows have been quite complex since 2001. UNHCR has documented the largest return movements in its history, with over four million individuals returning to Afghanistan. Sources indicate difficulties in determining accurate figures of returnees, particularly from Pakistan, due to factors such as that the Afghan refugee caseload in Pakistan had not been updated in line with the significant birth rate, the issue of ‘recyclers’ who took part in the return process to Afghanistan multiple times in order to benefit from the assistance provided and the fact that many of those returning were less-documented urban refugee populations (Kronenfeld, 2008; Turton & Marsden, 2002).

In 2016, 1.5 million registered and an estimated one million unregistered Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan and 982,000 registered refugees (and up to two million unregistered) in Iran (UNHCR, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2015; Clayton, 2015). In Pakistan, 85 percent of Afghans are Pashtun, while the remainder includes Tajiks and Uzbeks (European Resettlement Network, 2013). In Iran, over 70 percent of the Afghan population belong to the vulnerable Hazara and Tajik ethnic groups, with the remainder being predominantly Pashtun. While some 5.7 million Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, voluntary repatriation has since been scaled down due to the volatile security situation in Afghanistan (ibid). In January 2016, the US Institute of Peace advised that ‘given the country’s deteriorating security situation and dire state of the economy, Afghanistan is not fully prepared to continue receiving large influxes of returnees’. Noting that ‘lack of access to land, essential services and income-earning opportunities and exposure to violent conflict means that returnees often become displaced internally [...] resettling in large numbers in urban areas, putting additional strain on services’ (Ahmadi & Lakhani, 2016).
The number of IDPs in Afghanistan declined from an estimated 1.2 million in 2001 to 230,000 in 2009 as those previously displaced returned to their place of origin (UNHCR, 2001; 2009). However, since 2009 displacements have been rising and in July 2015 the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that at least 948,000 people were internally displaced due to conflict and violence. The pursuit of economic opportunities has also triggered an increasing trend of rural to urban migration of both returnees and those who never left: in 2006, approximately 30 percent of returnees were estimated to have settled in Kabul (Stigter, 2006).

At the same time, largely undocumented, informal, circular migration continues between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Many refugees returned in stages, or conducted scoping visits as part of their decision to return (Monsutti, 2008). A 2008 study along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border found that official documentation of entry and exit numbers between the country varied widely from the actual numbers moving, and that the vast majority were low-skilled males moving temporarily for work or to maintain social networks (Altai Consulting, 2009).

Beyond the ‘near diaspora’ of Pakistan and Iran, data from the World Bank indicates that the most significant stocks of foreign-born Afghan nationals in the ‘wider diaspora’ were located in Germany and the United States in 2007. Many of the Afghans in Germany lived in Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main (Braakman, 2005). In 2012, the second largest group of asylum applications received in Germany were from Afghans at 7,498 applications, which was 11.6 percent of all applications. According to the American Community Survey, 62,617 ‘foreign-born’ Afghans lived in the US in 2014, down from 65,972 Afghans in 2006 (Kuschminder & Dora, 2009). Of the figures in 2006, 53 percent entered the US before 1990, 28.3 percent between 1990 and 2000 and 18.5 percent since 2000 (United States Census Bureau, 2006).

Most remittances back to Afghanistan came from the Afghan populations in the ‘wider diaspora’ rather than from Pakistan and Iran. The International Fund for Agricultural Development estimated that USD 2.485 billion was remitted to Afghanistan in 2006 representing nearly 30 percent of GDP. A World Bank study in 2003 found that of the households receiving remittances, only 31 percent were receiving them from Pakistan or Iran.
4. BACKGROUND SUMMARY: NATURE AND THE DRIVERS OF MIGRATION INSIDE PAKISTAN AND OUT OF PAKISTAN (1947-DATE)

1947-1951: Partition

The ‘Partition’ of India and formation of the state of Pakistan in August 1947 was accompanied by one of the largest, most violent and rapid mass migration movements in history. An estimated 14.5 million people migrated within the span of four years (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, & Mian, 2008). Indian Muslims (termed ‘mohajir’ in Pakistan) moved across the border into West Pakistan, increasing the population of the coastal city of Karachi by an estimated 30 percent. Smaller populations of Bengalis and Burmese also moved to the west of Pakistan at the partition. In terms of outward movement, the vast majority of Hindus and Sikhs living in the newly formed Pakistan crossed into India: the percentage of Hindus and Sikhs living in Pakistani Punjab fell from 22 percent in 1931 to 0.16 percent in 1951 (ibid).

1950s-1970s: Migration to the United Kingdom

The majority of British people with Pakistani origin trace their roots back to just two areas in Pakistan: Mirpur in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Attock in Punjab. Both historically shipbuilding and river-fairing communities, men from Mirpur and Attock were recruited as stokers on British steam-liners between 1880 and 1940 following the collapse of British Indian river trade due to the extension of the railway (Ballard, 2003). Some later settled in Great Britain, predominantly working in labour hungry munitions factories in Birmingham and Bradford and textile mills in the Pennines. When the British government partially funded the Mangla Dam hydroelectric project that displaced a large population in Mirpur, offering work visas to Great Britain as part of the compensation package, many Mirpuris accepted the offer and followed the already-established migration routes and networks to Bradford, Birmingham and other areas in Great Britain (Gazdar, 2003). Although many initially saw the move as a temporary sojourn for employment purposes, the community grew through chain migration (particularly due to the Mirpuri tradition of cousin marriage) and births and many eventually settled permanently (Ballard, 2003). The British Pakistani population, defined in terms of country of birth or ethnicity, was 24,900 in 1961, 127,565 in 1971, 295,461 in 1981 and had grown to 449,646 by 1991 (Rose, 1969; OPCS, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991). With stabilisation of the birth and death rates, the population is expected to reach an estimated 1 million. Populations of British Pakistanis continue to be heavily concentrated in the areas that had experienced acute labour

1970s-1980s: Migration to the Gulf

Migratory links between Pakistan and the Gulf have a long history. Together with Muslims from other countries, people from the Indian sub-continent have travelled to Saudi Arabia on umra visas to visit the holy sites of Mecca and Madinah, often trading or meeting the seasonal peak in labour demand in the services sector during the pilgrimage season (Gazdar, 2003). Pakistani Shi’ites, and particularly Baloch had religious linkages to Iran while the Baloch also had political and historical migratory connections to the Sultanate of Oman (ibid).

When the oil boom started in the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq and Iran, the Pakistanis were some of the first to capitalise on this opportunity, using these pre-established links and networks. From the 1970s onward, an estimated 2 million predominantly young male migrant workers met the emerging economies’ sudden demand for construction workers as well as peripheral transport, trade and services including public and private security. Most workers were from rain-fed areas of low and seasonal agricultural output such as the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), northern Punjab and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (ibid).

By the early 1980s, the foreign exchange earnings from migrant remittances were greater than the sum of all those earned through other sources such as exports, and equated to 10 percent of GNP (ibid). The Pakistani government launched a number of initiatives to facilitate, encourage and formalise both the flows of labour migration to the Gulf and the flow of remittances back to Pakistan. While these initiatives had some success, for example, the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) has registered 4.54 million Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia and 2.93 million working in the UAE since 1971 (Pakistan Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, 2016), it is likely that irregular and informal movements of both migrant workers and remittances are substantial. Among migrants documented as working overseas by the BEOE between 1971 to 2015, 51 percent were working in Saudi Arabia, 33% in the United Arab Emirates and 7 percent in Oman. Other Middle Eastern and North African countries account for a further 6 percent while those working in the UK account for less than 1 percent of the total.
1970s: Influx from East Pakistan/Bangladesh

Political upheaval, military rule and inter-ethnic tensions between East and West gave rise in 1970 to a protest movement that was violently suppressed by the military of West Pakistan. Bangladesh won its independence in 1971, causing significant migration of Hindus to India. At the same time, a number of Bangladeshis who wished to retain their Pakistani citizenship migrated to Pakistan. This population is generally referred to as Biharis although not all of them originate from Bihar (Gazdar, 2003).

1970s onwards: Migration to Australia and Norway

Australia: Migration flows of Pakistani nationals to Australia have been relatively small in scale, but provide interesting contrast to those to the UK and the Gulf. The first recorded migration movements from the area that is now Pakistan was of ‘Afghans’ from Balochistan who migrated to Australia as camel drivers in the 19th century (Iqbal, 2014). However, after that date the ‘White Australia’ migration policy effectively halted any further influx from the Indian sub-continent. This policy was again relaxed in the 1960s and migration flows began from 1962 onwards. Migrants were mostly from urban areas including Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad and generally professionals with tertiary education, again as a result of Australia’s immigration policies and system. In the 1991 census there were only 5,930 Pakistani nationals in Australia, growing to 11,920 in 2001, 16,990 in 2006 and 30,218 in 2011 (ibid).

Norway: Pakistani nationals constitute the largest immigrant group in Norway, although absolute numbers are not comparable to the Gulf or the UK. In 1996, government records indicated 19,400 people of Pakistani origin in Norway, composed of 11,800 first generation and 7,600 second generation immigrants. A liberal immigration policy between 1970 and 1975 enabled the first Pakistani nationals to arrive, with 990 living in Norway by 1971. Although immigration was restricted after 1975, the population continued to grow through family reunification and marriages. Eighty to ninety percent of Pakistani nationals in Norway originate from rural areas of Punjab such as Gujrat and Jhelum, with a large proportion from Kharian tehsil in Gujrat.

1980s: Refugee influx from Afghanistan and Burma

As documented above, the invasion of Soviet troops into Afghanistan caused a massive influx of up to 2.5 million Afghan refugees crossing Pakistan’s border. Refugees were housed in camps but also established large slum areas on the peripheries of urban centres such as Karachi in Sindh. The influx of predominantly
Pashtun Afghan refugees into Pakistani Balochistan also had an impact on pre-existing ethnic tensions between the province’s Pashtun, Baloch and Punjabi inhabitants (Gazdar, 2003).

A relatively smaller but still significant influx of Burmese Muslims or Rohingya occurred into Pakistan in the 1980s as a result of persecution and discrimination in both Bangladesh and Burma. The size of the current population of Burmese origin is estimated between 300,000 to 1 million, and most live in Karachi. Most Burmese are undocumented: although many have lived in Pakistan for thirty or forty years they are denied Pakistani citizenship, and generally resisted the registration attempts made by the National Alien Registration Authority (NARA).

1990s to date

By the 1990s, major construction projects in the Gulf had been completed, inflation eroded the oil boom and labour competition arose in the form of Bangladeshi, Thai and Indonesian labour migrants. Many Pakistanis’ choice of destination countries started to shift towards Western Europe and North America as a result (Ballard, 2003).

The 1998 census revealed that 10 million people or 8 percent of the population were internal or international migrants, although the international migrants compose only immigrants rather than emigrants (Gazdar, 2003). Two-thirds of internal migrants lived in urban areas, and most listed as reasons for migration that they were moving with the head of the household (43%), moving for marriage (17%), employment (12%) and business (9%). Rural to urban migration was significant, although some rural to rural migration was caused by development projects, droughts, agricultural seasonality and pastoralism. By 2003, remittances had grown to USD 2.4 billion, representing 4 percent of GNP (ibid).

Over the past three decades, internal migration in Pakistan has been driven by conflict, natural disasters and economic factors. Insecurity and military operations against non-state armed groups particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Malakand Division caused waves of displacement and return movements to both camps and non-camp locations across Khyber Paktunkhwa (KPK) province. Natural disasters including the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, reoccurring flooding in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2015, the 2015 Badakshan earthquake as well as the drought conditions in Tharparkar and Umerkot districts in south-eastern Sindh have caused both temporary and prolonged displacement, as well as exacerbating trends of rural to urban migration.
5. **FINDINGS: THEMATIC AREAS**

5.1 Thematic area 1: Migrant profiles

Partial data regarding the profile of Afghan and Pakistani migrants en route to and reaching Europe exists. Most data is available on migrants who have reached Turkey and then Greece, meaning that migrants who fly directly to Europe or who reach Europe via a route that does not transit through Turkey and Greece are not captured.

Profile of Afghan and Pakistani nationals leaving their home-country

Data-collection within Afghanistan and Pakistan on the demographic and social characteristics of migrants departing towards Europe is not extensive. In Afghanistan many migrants irregularly cross borders with Pakistan and Iran making it almost impossible for the Afghan government and other actors to collect information on the profiles of Afghans that depart. A study on cross border movements found that most Afghans (70-80%) crossing into Pakistan were single male individuals without families, with 81 percent travelling in an irregular manner, without valid travel documents (Altai Consulting, 2009). The study also found that the cross-border movement records kept by border officials only counted a very small percentage of actual cross-border flows (ibid). In addition the nature of information collected by the Afghan Border Police (ABP)\(^3\) at legal border crossing points does not include many demographic and social variables that would enhance the profiling of Afghan and other migrants.

More recently non-government actors have initiated small-scale activities to collect more information on the demographic and social characteristics of potential migrants. Unfortunately, however, much of this research has not been published and the data that is available often has rather small sample sizes and is therefore rather anecdotal but not generally representative.

Anecdotal information collected in various final destination countries shows that a significant number of Afghan nationals that have recently arrived did not depart from Afghanistan but rather from Pakistan or Iran where they were living as refugees or undocumented migrants for many years. It does however not explicitly provides information on the demographic and social profiles of Afghans leaving from Iran and Pakistan to Europe. Efforts have been made in 2014 by the Australian National University, conducting a

\(^3\) Information mainly collected by ABP largely focuses on biometrics and passport registration, this information is not used to analyze net-migration and trends.
study to profile migrants leaving for Europe from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Final analysis and findings from this study have not yet been published.

Data is however available on the analysis of profiles of returned migrants from Europe to Afghanistan, assisted by the IOM, revealing that the majority of returnees are young single Afghan men. During 2015, 92 percent of all returnees were single and 53 percent were aged between 15 and 26 years old. Initial data findings of IOM Afghanistan assisted returns in 2016 (up to May) show that that 67 percent of returnees are aged between 15 and 26 years old. Family returns have increased and make up 15 percent of the return figures.

In terms of collected data in Pakistan, most existing data focuses on profiles of migrants en route to and in the Gulf countries rather than to Europe. The Overseas Employment Corporation collects data including the province of origin, socioeconomic profile, age and gender, but reports that 96 percent of migrants go to Gulf countries. Within the scope of the stakeholder surveys, respondents identified specific places of origin, including Mirpur, Gujrat in central Punjab, Karachi and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan. A situational analysis of migration to and from Pakistan notes that the Federal Investigation Authority (FIA) has identified 23 main departure districts for irregular migrants from Pakistan, concentrated in central and south Punjab as well as the frontier region with Afghanistan. The report also identifies tendencies of migrants from certain districts to aim for different destination countries: those from Mirpur and Jhelum tend to travel to the United Kingdom, those from Gujrat and Gujranwala to mainland Europe, those from Quetta and particularly Hazara aim for Australia, and migrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province predominantly travel to the Gulf (UNODC, 2011). A baseline study of irregular migration conducted in 2009 found that the majority of such migration was occurring from Punjab and particularly from Gujrat, Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Sialkot districts, although the data source appears to have been media monitoring rather than from official sources (EBDM, 2009).

In general, stakeholders tend to believe that Pakistani nationals rather migrate through legal channels to Europe, and if they become irregular migrants, it is through irregular stay such as overstaying visas rather than irregular entry. It is also assumed that the high numbers of circular, irregular migration between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran may hinder data collection efforts, with transit via Iran masking any populations leaving for Europe.
Profile of Afghans and Pakistani nationals in Turkey

Despite some research gaps, there is more concrete information on Afghans and Pakistani (transit-) migrants in Turkey available. Information on asylum applicants in Turkey is disaggregated by month, nationality, age and gender and it is therefore possible to track trends of especially Afghan asylum seekers and their demographics on a monthly basis from January 2012 onwards (UNHCR Turkey, 2016). However, data on asylum seekers is not continuous: new registrations of Afghans were interrupted in May 2013, before increasing dramatically with additional capacity in March 2015 (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2016). The monthly trends therefore cannot be considered fully accurate for the whole period. In terms of the total caseloads, it is unclear to what extent the data is reviewed and cleaned to remove individuals who have left Turkey (ibid, Interview with IOM Turkey, 2016). Additionally, the data covers only those individuals who choose to register in Turkey, and therefore does not cover irregular migrants who avoid detection or detention. Data regarding the recording of irregular migrants in Turkey from the Turkish Coast Guard was only disaggregated by nationality in 2015.

Data on the profile of Pakistani (transit-) migrants to Europe seem to be scarcer. The caseload is relatively small and therefore is often not represented in the nationality disaggregation of the available data. For example, asylum applicant statistics in Turkey disaggregate Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Somali nationals, but any Pakistani applicants fall into the ‘other’ category (UNHCR Turkey, 2016). It is also possible that nationality swapping occurs between Pakistani and Afghan nationals – at least one stakeholder interviewed reporting that Pakistani nationals sometimes present themselves as Afghans and even travel to Afghanistan before embarking on the journey in order to gain knowledge that will support asylum claims as Afghans. Frontex also mentions the incidence of nationality swapping, noting the high demand for Syrian passports, identity cards, birth certificates and residence permits (Frontex, 2016a). Again in the data on apprehensions by the Turkish Coast Guard and Gendarmerie in 2015, Pakistani nationals are not specifically mentioned but may fall into the 12 percent of individuals of ‘other’ nationalities (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe: Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route, January – December 2016). Since June 2016, DTM in Turkey started its Migrant Presence Monitoring exercise, consolidating information from government and other sources on migrants in Turkey (IOM Turkey, 2016).
Profile of Afghan and Pakistani nationals in Europe (transit and final destination)

Data is available regarding the arrivals of Afghan and Pakistani nationals in Europe. The Government of Greece has published annual figures, keeping records on irregular migrants disaggregated by nationality from 2009 to June 2016. Both Afghan and Pakistani nationals have consistently figured in the top five nationalities apprehended over this time period.

Table 3 - Apprehensions of irregular Afghan and Pakistani migrants in Greece (2009-June 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016 (6 months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>17,828</td>
<td>28,299</td>
<td>28,528</td>
<td>16,584</td>
<td>6,412</td>
<td>12,901</td>
<td>213,267</td>
<td>40,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>4,854</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td>19,975</td>
<td>11,136</td>
<td>3,982</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>27,261</td>
<td>8,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Greece, Ministry for the Protection of the Citizen

A 2013 report drawing on qualitative data from stakeholders, including migrant associations, found that most Afghans in Greece were between 12-30 years old, generally unmarried and either Hazara leaving Iran or Pashtun coming directly from Afghanistan. Stakeholders reported that trends in destination choices often depended on places of origin: Pashtuns and those from Kandahar and Logar generally wished to go to the United Kingdom; Tajiks and those from Herat aimed for Germany; Hazaras generally aimed for Sweden and Austria (Dimitriadi, 2013).

UNHCR disaggregated its data by month from January 2016 onwards, by country of arrival and country of origin (UNHCR, 2016a). This data captures the majority of new arrivals to Europe, although it cannot be ruled out that some individuals may avoid detection. It shows that Afghan nationals make up the second largest share of arrivals comprising percent of the total whilst Pakistan nationals make up 3 percent of the total and rank 6th overall. The data does not capture those still in transit to Europe, and migrants who might remain or become stranded en route in Turkey, Iran or Pakistan. Demographic breakdown is provided per country of arrival, but not by country of origin. However, a profiling exercise carried out for three months from January to March 2016 captures detailed representative information of the new Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan arrivals per month (UNHCR, 2016b). Profiling data collected includes: age and gender demographics, marital status, incidence of special needs (pregnant, lactating, physical and mental disabilities) whether individuals travelled with family members or alone, whether they transited another country for more than six months, level of education attained, religion, ethnicity and main occupation in country of origin. For the Afghan population, this report confirms findings from previous studies, as well as from the DTM flow monitoring survey, that the largest group of Afghan migrants consists of single males,
many of them still underage. Within the UNHCR study, 75 percent reported to have left Afghanistan due to the conflict and violence. Furthermore, another main finding reveals that 16 percent of the interviewees claimed to have stayed in another country (other than Afghanistan) for six months or more before starting their journey to Greece and most mentioned lack of documentation (35%) and fear of expulsion (23%) as main reasons for leaving that country (ibid).

Demographic data collected through DTM flow monitoring surveys at various entry and transit countries in Europe between October 8, 2015 and February 29, 2016 are summarised in the figures below:

As outlined in the figures above, findings of the flow monitoring surveys collected amongst Afghan and Pakistani migrants on route through Greece and various western Balkan countries reveal that the majority of Pakistani migrants are single males aged between 15 and 35 years old. Over half of the interviewed Afghans were single and 62 percent of Afghan nationals interviewed en route to Europe were aged between 15 and 25 years old, of which the majority was male.
More recently various actors (including IOM) have started collecting more extensive data on migrants that arrive in Turkey and Europe. With the extension of arrival surveys, including more questions on different characteristics during the last months the data enabled international actors, governments and others to better profile the migrants that arrive in Turkey and Europe. Nevertheless, since much of this information has only recently begun to be collected it is not possible to explore if migrant profiles have changed over time and to identify trends with the current data available. It has to be acknowledged that existing data often lacks variables that are able to show much more about the demographics and especially the social features of those migrants. If such data exists, it is often not representative of other groups of the same nationality or lacks clear relationships between variables. Furthermore, we must also consider that a significant amount of the data is coming from official sources, such as the Turkish government. This data lacks the ability to shed light on the profiles of those migrants travelling undetected and can therefore not be used to produce generalized conclusions applicable to the whole group of migrants. Concrete data-gaps still exist where migrants’ profiles are concerned (including actual routes) in the Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian region. Another gap that has been identified is the starting point of the migrant’s journey and where migrants have resided during the last year(s) before departure. Particularly where Afghan migrants are concerned it is important to understand if the migrant’s formal country of residence was actually Afghanistan. The group of Pakistani nationals have not yet gained as much attention in research as Afghans have since much of the research has been rather focused on the flows from Pakistan to the Gulf States instead of to the European countries. Therefore, it is for example important that Pakistanis start to be viewed as an individual group, capturing their numbers individually rather than aggregating them with other nationalities.
5.2 Thematic area 2: Migration routes and trajectories

Detailed data regarding migration routes from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to Turkey are poorly documented. While information on routes from Turkey and within Europe is available, its accuracy is questionable given that routes are amended rapidly and also constantly due to factors including border surveillance, smugglers’ operations and asylum policies.

Departure from Afghanistan and Pakistan

Although sources generally agree that migration journeys begin in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran, there is less information available on the actual departure points of both Afghan and Pakistani migrants, while this is the case for Kandahar, Herat, Islam Qala, Nimroz and Zaranj in Afghanistan are mentioned by several sources (Echavez & Bagaporo, 2014; Boedeker, 2012). A lack of such information makes it impossible to identify trends amongst different communities for out-migration and to draw concrete maps on cross-border movements and migration routes in the region. In addition, when only focusing on the Afghan target group, it is important to obtain information on whether individuals actually departed from Afghanistan and to map what percentage of those individuals have been short or long term (un-documented) migrants in Iran and Pakistan. The complex migration flows between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the ‘normality’ of multi-directional cross-border flows and existence of transnational networks adds to the difficulties in identifying and quantifying the departure locations of migrants (Monsutti, 2008).

Various scholars have aimed to draw a picture of the main routes from western and southern Afghanistan as well as on border crossing points into Pakistan and Iran, primary meeting points in Iran, and the available modalities of travel depending on the migrant’s available resources. However, sample sizes are rather small and information on routes was collected outside the region (Kushminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015).
UNODC (2013) reports that the most common route of exit from Pakistan is overland through the Balochistan province into Iran. There is a legal border checkpoint at Taftan on the Pakistan side of the border to Mirjaveh on Iranian side. Many also cross at the unofficial point from Mand Bullo in Pakistan to Pishin in Iran (UNODC, 2013). Nevertheless, a study in 2008 of 51 Pakistani and Afghan migrants to Europe found that all Pakistanis used flights for some or part of their journey – either direct, via the Gulf or another third country where visas can be obtained relatively easily, or to a transit country, continuing the journey overland. The most popular overland route mentioned by respondents at that time was to fly to Dushanbe, travel overland to Moscow and then onwards to Eastern and Western Europe (Koser, 2008).

It becomes clear that a variety of journey options exist, primarily dependent on the resources of the migrant. The available resources determine: how fast the journey is, where and how long the individual will transit, what stages of the journey will be done legally, whether forged or no documentation are used, which stages will be accompanied, whether in groups or alone as well as the modes of transportation. In line with thematic area 3, on how journeys are financed, Koser and Kuschminder (2016) in their research on decision-making in transit countries found that those with more access to resources are consequently able to take more direct routes to their destination, while those migrants with fewer resources are more likely to migrate in stages – in that sense going at each stage as far as their money permits.

**Routes from Turkey to Europe**

An estimated 400,000 migrants were recorded in Turkey from 1997 to 2003, of which 70,000 were recorded in the Edirne province attempting to depart to Greece across the River Evros. Of the total migrant stock, most were Iraqi (31%), Iranians (20%) and Pakistanis (10%). Together, Afghans, Bangladeshis, Palestinians, Indians and Turks made up an additional 33 percent (Içduygu, 2004). This source shows that flows of Afghans and Pakistanis along the Greece-Turkey route have a long-standing history. Flows of both Afghans and Pakistanis have escalated significantly since this period both in terms of absolute numbers and with regard to the proportion of the total flow. In July 2016, the refugee population within Turkey amounted to more than 3 million (ECHO, 2016). The border crossing point at the River Evros is now less used due to the implementation of security measures such as the building of a fence in 2011 at Orestiada causing the sea route to the Greek islands of the west coast of Turkey to increase in significance. Frontex (2016) reports that the most common route to reach Europe for Afghan and Pakistani nationals is via the Eastern Mediterranean sea route to the Aegean islands. Others have entered Greece via the land border, or alternatively have exited Turkey directly into southern Bulgaria.
Studies on migrant journeys to and through Turkey highlight the interrupted and staged manner of many journeys through Turkey, identifying long periods of immobility punctuated by shorter instances of travel (Kaytaz, 2016). One study found that ‘transit’ or ‘immobile’ experiences varied from uprooted waiting to quite settled lives, with many transit situations turning into home-like situations and vice versa, highlighting the fact that migration aspirations are likely to change over time and are not necessary sequenced by onward movements (Schapendonk, 2014).

Once leaving Turkey, a study by Antonopoulos and Winterdyk (2006) provides greater granularity on the routes from Greece to Albania and Bulgaria, mentioning the passage through the Rodopi mountain range. The crossing from Greece to the FYR of Macedonia at Lake Doirani and Gevgellia and the River Evros crossing between Greece and Turkey is also mentioned (Antonopoulos & Winterdyk, 2006). Within Greece, several sources point to the practice of hiding migrants in concealed spaces such as trucks and cargo shipments and driving them directly through Schengen countries - a practice which reduces risks of interception, decreases the duration of the journey and cuts out the cost of local facilitators (Jandl, 2007). The increasing use of false or forged documents is also noted (ibid). Frontex has identified and monitored eight main routes into Europe, although two were combined in 2015 resulting in seven current routes. Frontex data is published in their Annual Risk Analyses and Risk Analysis Network Quarterly Reports and contains data and information on passenger flows across external borders including detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries, document fraud, detections of illegal stay, facilitators apprehended and asylum applications.

While these routes have been identified as the most prominent a literature review compiled in 2015 by scholars from Maastricht University provides information regarding changing preferences for certain routes over time in response to factors including border surveillance, security in transit countries and policy changes (Kushminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). Recent developments in 2016 – particularly those in response to the EU Turkey agreement – have not yet been covered. Based on internal and external data collection, major current routes taken by Afghan and Pakistani nationals are the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans route (UNODC, 2013). However, there is a debate on whether tightening border controls and stricter migration policy will lead to the rising prominence of other routes, including the

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1. Eastern Mediterranean Route: between Turkey and the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea
2. Central Mediterranean Route: from Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia to Italy
3. Western Mediterranean Route: between Guinea, Algeria, Morocco and Spain
4. Western African Route: connects Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco with the Spanish Canary Islands
5. Eastern Land Border: emerged in 2015 at the land borders of Norway and Finland with the Russian Federation (the so-called Arctic route)
6. Western Balkan Route: especially Afghans and Syrians mainly on Hungary’s and Croatia’s borders with Serbia
7. Black Sea Route: Not commonly used – coming from Syria, Iran and Iraq
Central Mediterranean route, which is currently predominantly used by African migrants to Italy, or routes in the Central or Eastern Balkans. Research on the monitoring of migration flows through Croatia from September to November 2015 has shown the adaptation of the flows in response to the closing of Hungary’s border to Serbia in mid-September and Hungary’s border to Croatia in mid-October, effectively causing Croatia to become the main corridor towards Hungary and Slovenia en route to Austria and Germany. Numbers show that 460,000 migrants were transported through Croatia between mid-September and the end of November, at a rate of around 10,000 per day at peak flow (Čapo, 2015).

Data collected through DTM flow monitoring surveys at various entry and transit countries in Europe between October 8, 2015 and February 29, 2016 provides the following information:

In addition, the FM-survey also found that the majority of respondents (92%) reported departing from Afghanistan. Among those reportedly departing from Afghanistan, 40 percent reported departing from the province of Kabul, 9 percent from Nangarhar, 8 percent from Kapisa, another 5 percent from Ghazni, and the remaining from other provinces within Afghanistan. The other 8 percent reported departing from other countries, notably Iran and Turkey.

A study conducted in 2009 on Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants to Greece reported that most migrants crossed irregularly or overstayed on a tourist visa, and then often remained in Greece undocumented for long periods of time. Some succeeded in regularizing their status through occasional regularization schemes or would apply for asylum to ‘buy time’ (Broersma & Lazarescu, 2009). A large informal economy and co-ethnic networks provided support in terms of employment, housing, loans and remittances to facilitate migrants’ stay in the country. The role of migrant associations was particularly noted in supporting Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants (ibid).
Major current routes for Afghan and Pakistani nationals from Turkey are the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans route.

Other Routes (uncommon)

Aside from the primary route of Afghanistan/Pakistan – Iran – Turkey – Greece, respondents of the stakeholder survey and secondary sources identified minor, alternative routes via Central Asian states and from Russia to Norway/Finland or Belarus/Ukraine – Poland – Germany. Migrants for whom air travel is an option might use a variety of routes including via Sudan and Libya, Dubai or Abu Dhabi.
DATA GAPS – TA 2 MIGRATION ROUTES AND TRAJECTORIES

Information gaps exist on the actual routes taken within the Afghan-Pakistan and Iranian region. There is also no concrete data on which regions and/or communities have the largest out (ward)-migration flows. There is no accurate, survey based data on regional dimensions which allows us to have concrete evidence on movements in the regions. Information gaps also exist regarding future trends in migration routes from Turkey to Europe. This is also due to the unpredictable nature of policy changes etc. The effects of the tightening of the Turkish border controls and increasing forced return movements from Europe on routes and modalities are, as yet, uncertain and flows will require regular monitoring and profiling to measure and capture any changes. The recentness of the EU-Turkey deal also creates a data gap on what has changed, within the last year and how the deal has influenced the routes used by migrants to reach Turkey. The complexities of migration journeys is generally not captured in the data – the general routes are most often described as linear and continuous, without fully capturing the extent of transit periods, circular migration, and repeated or failed attempts to cross borders. Analyses generally do not capture the range of migration options and the variety of experience according to the migrants’ socioeconomic status and resources. These analyses also often lack the capability of understanding the multi-directional nature of migrants’ journeys. When we consider the case study of Afghans and Pakistani migrants, this point is crucial due to the scope of cross border flows. Recent studies have acknowledged this fact and try to integrate the nature of these flows in their approaches, however the problems often lies in small samples sizes, or selection biases which makes the data often not representative of the larger population.

5.3 Thematic area 3: Resourcing the journey

The desk review under this thematic area sought concrete data on the costs of irregular migratory routes to Europe and what financial means migrants use to pay for this journey, while also considering the social and cultural capital that migrants draw from to make their journeys. Data regarding the means by which migrants and their families finance irregular migration journeys, and the modalities of making these
payments is rare and almost exclusively anecdotal as well as predominantly ad hoc. Reports indicate that there are a range of services available from intermediaries, depending on the means and resources of the migrants: a migrant with enough resources can pay for a so-called ‘Touchdown package’ which includes flight and fraudulent documents to the intended destination country (Kushmander, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). Information from Frontex (2016a) highlights the fact that Afghans and Pakistanis often organize their journeys in their countries of departure, paying smugglers for the whole trip through Greece and then on to their final destination in Europe. Furthermore, Frontex intelligence sources have detected various Afghan and Pakistani cases where sea-crossings – without relying on facilitators - were organized by migrants themselves (ibid). Other sources provide anecdotal evidence of migrants that pay up-front in their country of origin for the entire journey, others make fund transfers in stages depending on the completion of phases of the journey, some, especially those with very few resources work en route to pay for the next stage. Evidence is found in Afghanistan that smugglers sometimes also make agreements with potential migrants stipulating that payments will only be made upon arrival in Europe.

Financial resources

Few sources provide data on how Afghan and Pakistani migrants finance their journey to Europe. The most common financial sources that migrants use to pay for their irregular migration to Europe (and often its facilitators) generally include savings, sale of property or assets or taking out loans from friends, family or moneylenders (Linke, 2016). The vast majority of people prefer to borrow money from relatives or community members than from formal services such as banks – the restrictions and conditions imposed by banks are viewed as onerous and disproportionate to the sums of money available (Hagen-Zanker, et al., 2014). Class and poverty is mentioned as a key factor influencing the ability to migrate, by a number of sources. The poorest will not be able to secure the loans needed in order to travel, nor have the assets to sell or the ability to save (ibid). Having access to a combination of economic, social and cultural capital shapes the routes as well as channels migrants can follow, the destinations they can reach and their life chances after migration (Van Hear, 2014). Capital is the main determinant of capacity for mobility, without it Afghans remain in the country of origin and/or transit country for indeterminate periods (Dimitriadi, 2015).

Debts are relatively easily incurred in the place of origin, but must be repaid at the destination or after an agreed number of attempts have been made (most sources indicate that three attempts are included in the price). If migrants do not gain a legal status in the attempted time frame that allows them to work
legally, they may be forced into illicit activities, debt bondage and exploitation that may approach a modern form of slavery (Brolan, 2002). Debt-financed migration challenges the oppositional categories of ‘slavery’ and ‘freedom’ as well as ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ as indebtedness can lead to both serious and extensive restrictions on freedom, while at the same time constituting a means by which people seek to extend and secure their freedoms (Davidson, 2013).

One study by Koser (2008) investigated the movements of 50 Pakistani and Afghan nationals to Europe. The routes used by Pakistani nationals all involved flights for all or part of the journey, however, as the data was gathered in 2008, its applicability to current flows remains questionable. Nevertheless, the study found a range of means by which money was raised, from savings to loans to sale of property, land and jewellery. 14 out of 51 respondents mentioned loans as either the single or at least part of their source to pay smugglers. Payments were made to a third party or ‘cashiers’ (most often a money lenders, sometimes a jeweller) who earns a commission or deposit on the transaction and releases the money to the smuggler once the migrant arrives at the destination, effectively functioning as a “money-back guarantee”. The study claims that smugglers keep half the money as profit and use half to pay other intermediaries such as forgers and border officials (ibid). A study by Içduygu (2004) also mentions the guarantee system using a third party ‘cashier’ but reports that it is more prevalent among Iraqis, whereas Afghans were more likely to have signed over property in exchange for the smuggler covering the costs of migration (Içduygu, 2004).

Migratory fees

Information on the rates paid by migrants is scattered, diverse and often anecdotal. Costs that were mentioned indicate an amount of USD 20,000 for forged documents and direct flights from Herat, Afghanistan to Europe, USD 15,000 for guaranteed entry into a Schengen country, EUR 100 for an Iranian visa for Afghans, USD 150-600 for illegal smuggling from Afghanistan to Iran, USD 700 for illegal smuggling from Iran to Turkey, USD 1,200 (adult) and USD 600 (child) for boat crossing from Turkey to Greece (EMN, 2015). In 2006, one study reported the average price for a Pakistani or Afghan national to travel to Greece was USD 3,000 -7,000, and the onward passage to a Greek island at USD 500-2,000 (Antonopoulos & Winterdyk, 2006). Factors including weather, supply and demand also impact the prices. One study reports annual changes in the cost of the trip from Afghanistan to Europe as a result of supply and demand dynamics, while another study reports price decreases of boat journeys to Greece during poor (and more dangerous) weather condition as for instance, during winter (Kushminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015; Danish Refugee Council, 2016). Some sources mention the variance in negotiating power of migrants: some
migrants are better informed and therefore have greater power to negotiate better rates, including ‘results-based payments’ payable only on reaching the destination or a particular stage (ibid).

DATA GAPS – TA 3 RESOURCING THE JOURNEY

While there is quite some ad hoc information from various sources, systematic studies that focus on the means and modalities of financing migrant journeys to Europe are missing. Much of the information has an anecdotal nature, and hard evidence is often lacking. Furthermore, since much of the information on resources is scattered, it is often difficult to see the whole picture and to connect the information which is exists. Research is also more extensive in explaining the financing of the journey in economic terms, i.e. how much money migrants had to spend on the smugglers and the other activities associated with the journey as well as providing information on how migrants were able to afford the journey such as savings, selling land etc. Less research has been conducted on the financing through social and cultural capital. Even though there are many studies which talk about the general importance of capital (also in the form of social and cultural capital) these theories have not been explicitly linked to the journeys of Afghan and Pakistani nationals in a way that relationships between the different forms of capital were drawn or established. While the link between social and cultural capital is often missing when explaining the financing of the journey, the literature becomes again more extensive on the importance of social remittances for Afghans. The extent to which fund transfers are made in cash through payments in the country of origin by family or informal systems such as hawala make it often difficult to understand the whole scope of this area. Smugglers’ means of enforcing debts incurred in the country of origin against those who reach a country of destination are also unknown and could be considered for investigation.

5.4 Thematic area 4: The role of intermediaries

Existing data on the role of intermediaries mainly concentrates on their role within the phase before the migration happens as well as during the course of the journey. The desk-review also aimed at collecting
information on the profile of the intermediaries and their access to individuals and networks that could facilitate irregular migration.

The different services

Surveyed stakeholders and secondary data sources consider intermediaries to play a vital role in the migration journey, although their specific role and the scope varies from person to person. With regard to the target population Frontex (2016c) describes that the smuggling networks also tend to serve specific nationalities; Pakistanis and Afghans being amongst them. Stakeholders responding to the survey on Afghanistan considered that the role of smugglers is crucial and pervasive in the sense that they were widely and easily accessible via travel agents and exchange markets as well as social networks. Also in the case of Pakistanis, it is known that a large proportion of irregular Pakistani migrants use migrant smuggling operations to cross borders (Aksel, et al., 2015).

The share of the total flow that travel with the assistance of smugglers and other intermediaries is disputed, and is further complicated by the fact that smugglers are often used for varying services and periods of the journey. Looking at the journey from Afghanistan to Iran, the role of smugglers is sometimes limited to the task of just negotiating with Baloch smugglers in southern Afghanistan, while others – and particularly in those cases when the smuggler and migrant originate from the same area – he may also include duties such as providing credit, finding employment, transferring money and delivering letters (Boedeker, 2012; Stigter, 2005). Recent research has pointed out that roughly two-thirds of all migrants use smuggler networks when they make their way to Europe (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015; Crawley, 2010). Another source reports that smugglers in Greece guide the journey, assist with overcoming or evading border control restrictions and provide information to assist the stay in Greece (Dimitriadi, 2015).

Smugglers’ Profiles

Several sources mention the fact that many smugglers were once migrants themselves and then became involved in the business through the need to finance their own journey and in order to remain for some time as part of the network (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2016). UNODC asserts that more Pakistanis are detected as facilitators of smuggling than Afghans, despite the overall number of Afghan irregular migrants being higher (UNODC, 2013). However, since 2012 neither Pakistanis nor Afghans show up in the top ten nationalities of apprehended facilitators reported by Frontex. Data from 2015 shows that the top
nationalities of apprehended facilitators are Morocco, Spain, Albania, Syria, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Italy (Frontex, 2016b).

Table 4 - Pakistani nationals as percentage of total apprehended facilitators 2009-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9171</td>
<td>8,629</td>
<td>7,720</td>
<td>7,252</td>
<td>10,234</td>
<td>12,023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Frontex Annual Risk Analyses 2010-2016

The importance of networks

Pakistani nationals also appear to have greater access to forged documents than Afghans, leading to the possible conclusion that forgers are better connected to networks in Pakistan. Since smuggling networks seem to be more organised and sophisticated in Pakistan, both Pakistani and Afghan nationals use the Pakistani smuggling networks (ibid). The network is described as a horizontal network without a strong central organization, but with varying ties (often along ethnic or nationality lines) and a tendency towards clustering across countries of origin, transit and destination (Içduygu & Toktas, 2002). Networks will involve smugglers themselves but also corrupt government employees such as border guards or visa officials (Kushminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). A study from 2004 in Turkey found that 90 percent of the smugglers were Turkish citizens, the remainder being Iraqi, Iranians, Greeks and Bulgarians (Içduygu, 2004). This information is also supported by the Europol data of 2015/2016, confirming that Turks make up the highest percentage of smugglers. Since Europol only has access to the data on officially reported data, the accuracy of this data is not entirely representative (Nielsen, 2016). Studies into corruption of border guard officials along the Balkan route may also shed light on the role of intermediaries (Đorđević, 2014).

Only a limited number of sources have conducted in-depth research into the social and economic organization of smuggling networks along the route to Europe. A study in 2006 focused mostly on smuggling networks for Albanians in Greece as these were the largest migrant flows at the time, but may also provide an insight into current organisational structures. Even though most of the smugglers were Greek, the majority of the groups also involved smugglers of the same ethnicity as their primary migrant client base. Smugglers within a group had specific functions assigned including roles such as leader, recruiters, transporters and guides, scouts, hotel or hostel owners, enforcers and public officials. In the place of origin, the study found that clients mostly initiated contacts with smugglers based on reputation, choosing those who were well known in their village or town. In transit countries, both smugglers and
migrants initiate contact at well-known meeting or assembly areas, the locations of which are communicated through networks (Antonopoulos & Winterdyk, 2006).

The human smuggling economy is also often regarded as a transnational, profitable business - with recruiters and advertisers in the countries of origin and financial, logistical and coordination structures as well as ‘integration’ services in the destination countries (ibid). Frontex (2016a), also points out the profitable and highly organized nature of the operations, while also highlighting the network’s association with the smuggling business of illegal drugs and weapons and the exploitation and poor treatment of migrants. In Pakistan, some of the stakeholders believed that most intermediaries are more likely to be involved in facilitating movement to the Gulf States than they are to Europe are. Stakeholders indicated that most travel to Europe is through legal means, and becomes irregular by overstaying the duration of their visas. In Afghanistan, especially in recent years, the smuggling business has increased significantly. Migrants often tend to become (temporary) smugglers themselves for parts of the route, mainly to fellow nationals (Europol, 2016).

**DATA GAPS – TA 4 ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES**

The role of intermediaries before and during the journey has not yet been studied for the two nationalities of interest as extensively as is necessary, leaving significant data gaps which, if filled, could enhance understanding the patterns of irregular migration journeys, what role networks play in facilitating movements and the potential profiles of intermediaries. As in other thematic areas, studies that have been done on the role of intermediaries are often not representative for the wider context. Furthermore, the fast changing natures of smugglers, their networks and their routes makes it hard to generalize from certain results to another contexts. Even though, there is quite some information on smugglers and intermediaries available in general, existing literature often only focuses on whether or not smugglers were involved and often lacks deeper analysis. No accurate and recent data has been published that provides information on actual numbers reporting how many and which nationalities of migrants make use of smuggling networks. In addition, more in-depth research has to be done on the social and economic organization of smuggling and the networks behind it in order to see the effect it has on migrants.
5.5 Thematic area 5: Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries

Data on vulnerability factors, protection risks and violations exists and sources of data are increasing, particularly in regards to unaccompanied children/minors. The information available on the topic is often linked to trafficking practices. Though the distinction between trafficking and smuggling is clear and also recognized in the field of academia, the research under this phase of the study predominantly aimed to focus on human smuggling. Whilst gathering information, assumptions were made that the often irregular nature of migrants’ movements, their desire to avoid detection and contact with authorities or NGOs, as well as the risk of detention and their extremely limited legal access, means that incidents are quite likely to be severely underreported.

Vulnerabilities along the route, in transit and destination countries

General research on potential vulnerabilities, risks and violations along Afghan and Pakistani migratory routes exists although, as previously mentioned, the number of incidences is assumed to be underreported. Information on vulnerabilities range from insufficient food and water for the journey, abandonment of ill or weak migrants en route, to violence and push-backs by border officials, being forced into dangerous and unsuitable boats, to smugglers demanding additional money for the next phase of the journey (Schaub, 2013; Danish Refugee Council, 2016; Breen, 2016).

Deaths

Information on deaths is patchy and inconsistent, and relatives often do not know the fate of their family members (Laczko et al., 2016). Most available reports and statistics on deaths of migrants are on the incidents of migrants drowning during sea crossing. The Hellenic Coast Guard reported 5,000 incidents of shipwrecks in 2015, rescuing 89,000 including 16,500 minors, however they also reported many fatalities (Anagnostopoulos, Triantafyllou, Xylouris, Bakatselos, & Giannakopoulos, 2016). The Mediterranean Sea has become the world’s most dangerous border between countries not at war with each other. The risk of dying while crossing the border is almost 2 percent, more dangerous than crossing the Rio Grande from Mexico to the United States or the Indian Ocean from Indonesia to Australia (Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014). Children make up 36 percent of those crossing by sea from Turkey to Greece and accounted for at least 30 percent of recorded deaths in the Aegean Sea in 2015.
A quantitative study in 2015 audited 160 asylum and immigration related deaths among migrants representing 50 nationalities in Europe (Abu-Hayyeh & Webber, 2015). Of these 60 committed suicide due to factors including fear of deportation, and the exacerbation of mental health issues during detention. Twenty-six died of illnesses that were untreated, delayed or inadequate treatment or poor accommodation/detention conditions. Sixteen died of destitution and exposure from living on the streets or in derelict buildings. Nine died in direct contact with police or security officials, as a result of beatings, restraint or shooting. Four died while being chased, in accidents such as throwing themselves off buildings to evade capture. Trains hit four individuals from accommodation camps located dangerously close to railways. Two died of violence by violent room or cellmates and the remaining two died violently in their country of return following deportation after refusal of asylum (Abu-Hayyeh & Webber, 2015). The information of death rates among refugees on their way to Europe is rarely aggregated by nationalities therefore no explicit numbers are available for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, information (no concrete numbers) is available on the fact that a number of Afghans die every year on their way to Turkey, crossing the mountains in Iran.

*Abuses and gender-based violence*

A study on the decision making process of irregular migrants in transit (Pakistani and Afghans amongst them) showed that 62 percent of respondents in Greece and 52 percent in Turkey reported that they have experienced either physical abuse, verbal abuse or both, since their arrival in these countries. Within the scope of qualitative interviews in Turkey, both Afghan and Pakistani migrants pointed out the challenges and abuse they had suffered in their migration to Turkey (Koser & Kuschminder, 2016).

Incidence of sexual abuse and rape have been reported along the journey, and the lack of availability of necessary services has been criticized (Devi, 2016; Women’s Refugee Commission, 2016). From 223 in depth interviews with refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, 332 experiences of sexual and gender based violence were reported, mostly inflicted by ex-partners, partners or professionals. More than half of the experiences comprised sexual violence including rape and other forms of sexual exploitation (Keygnaert, Vettenburg, & Temmerman, 2015). Representative profiling of Afghan new arrivals conducted in Greece from January to March 2016 captured data on the means of protection from violations, types of violations, country where the violation occurred and category of perpetrator. In the case of Afghans it was especially stressed that inadequate living conditions such as no gendered division of sleeping spaces for males and females posed a threat to women’s security. The study also stressed that the line between smuggling and trafficking becomes much more blurry in the case of women, since many
women face the threat of becoming victims of trafficking along the route leading to sexual assaults and abuses. These crimes are not solely committed by the smugglers but often with local authorities such as border guards or police officers (Freedman J., 2016).

Female migrants are specifically affected by the risk and incidence of violence, reporting rape amongst others by smugglers, fear for their children and the burden of caring for them, attacks and harassment by the police and military, separation and detention away from husbands and families (Birchall, 2016; Freedman, 2016). Fear of violence and tension in camps and settlements led to families sleeping outside camps and thereby having less access to basic services. Women are particularly affected by the lack of privacy and protection, including the lack of well-lit, locked and separate sanitary facilities or an appropriate space to wash and change. Women who are suffering domestic violence form husbands during the journey reported that they find it impossible to leave them while en route, and not staying in one location long enough to access support where available (ibid).

**Vulnerabilities specific to unaccompanied minors**

As pointed out unaccompanied minors make up a large share of Afghans making their way to Europe. The Greek National Centre for Social Solidarity accepted 1,824 unaccompanied minors during 2015, 96 percent of which were boys and 4 percent under 12. Around 60 percent were Afghan nationals and 13 percent Syrians (ibid). However, the shortage of care places for minors relative to the demand meant that many were detained for lengthy periods in detention centers that have been described as hygienically deficient and overcrowded (Galante, 2014). Most sources agree that the largest demographic group of unaccompanied and separated minors are Afghan boys (Mougne, 2010; Frontex, 2010). A significant number of children required hospitalisation as both the experience in the country of departure and adversities en route had led to severe mental health problems, many related to repetitive exposure to violence and the constant lack of security (Anagnostopoulos, Triantafyllou, Xylouris, Bakatsellos, & Giannakopoulos, 2016). Interviews and mental health screening of 222 male Afghan unaccompanied and separated children in the UK found that 31 percent had emotional and behavioural problems, 35 percent had anxiety and 23 percent suffered from depression (Bronstein, Montgomery, & Ott, 2013).

Qualitative interviews with 29 children between 12 and 21 (nine girls and twenty boys), mostly from Afghanistan but also Pakistan and other nationalities shed light on the violations experienced by children in their country of origin as well as en route. Ten had been exploited, with experiences suggesting child trafficking. Four had been sold by family members. Five lost both parents in conflict and civil disorder while
thirteen had lost their fathers. Two had been tortured and four had witnessed violence against family members (Connolly, 2015).

DATA GAPS – TA 5 VULNERABILITY FACTORS IN ORIGIN TRANSIT AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES

The existing literature on the vulnerabilities faced by migrants on their way to Europe is quite extensive, however often limited to specific forms of vulnerabilities. While there is a lot of information on the risk of human trafficking, other fields are less researched. With regard to trafficking, a lot of the research is also focused on sexual exploitation rather than trafficking for the purpose of labour or organ transplantations. In recent years more information is becoming available on exploitation in the form of labour, nevertheless consistent data collection could be improved. Furthermore, data collection on the topic of abuse migrants experience en route but also within the destination countries should be improved. Koser and Kuschminder (2016) are already expanding this field of research by focusing on the transit countries Turkey and Greece, also with a focus on Afghan and Pakistani migrants, however data from other countries are missing. An area that has been understudied is the vulnerability migrants face once they have reached the destination countries. A lot of information concentrates on the transit phase. Stronger focus should also be placed on the topic of forced marriages including cases involving of minors and child marriages. While destination countries report that this is an increasing phenomenon, not much research has been done on the connection to the vulnerabilities girls face in this particular field en route. Furthermore, while there is quite good data on the sexual exploitation of women in origin, transit and destination countries, data on sexual exploitation of men is less developed. While there is relatively more data on vulnerabilities faced in Europe, much less exists on vulnerabilities faced in Iran and Turkey. Very little information and data exists on how migrants mitigate those risks and the qualitative nature of most studies make it difficult to compare levels of vulnerability between socio-economic profiles of migrants.
5.6 Thematic area 6: Drivers of migration and decision making

Significant academic literature, surveys and qualitative data exist regarding the factors influencing an individual’s decision to migrate, including data that relate specifically to flows of Afghan and Pakistani nationals to Europe. A recent literature review examines conceptual models of decision-making processes relating to migration as well as analyses of the hierarchical importance of specific factors influencing that decision (Kushman, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). Decisions to migrate may be made by the individual, as a family or by an elderly family or community member.

Reasons for leaving the country of origin

Reports generally investigate the extent to which factors such as security, conflict, the lack of livelihoods, and socioeconomic pressure influence an individual’s decision to migrate. There is a general consensus that factors have complex interactions, and vary from individual to individual. For Afghans, the deterioration of living conditions in their countries of origin has been documented over the past few years. This deterioration was documented in several ways including: a) the lack of economic opportunities, b) the deterioration of refugee environments, c) the increasing forced returns from Pakistan and Iran, d) poor prospects for refugee reintegration in Afghanistan, e) rising violence and discrimination against refugees, persecution of ethnic or religious minorities, f) the risk of recruitment into the Afghan National Security Forces, Afghan National Army or insurgent forces in Afghanistan, or into Syrian militias from Iran, and g) rising insecurity. Rising insecurity was particularly relevant for individuals who worked with the military or NGO organizations – following the withdrawal of ISAF forces (Ahmadi & Lakhani, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2015; 2013; Dimitriadi, 2013; Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, 2012; Alimia, 2014).

Moreover many migrants claim that despite the changing security and political landscape in Afghanistan they would not have decided to migrate if economic opportunities had been available. In a study on cross border movements to Pakistan, 64 percent of respondents cited lack of work in Afghanistan as their motivation to travel to Pakistan, mostly to work temporarily in unskilled or low-skilled professions such as in the construction, wholesale and retail sectors (Altai Consulting, 2009). Another study into circular movement from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan also found employment to be the primary reason for travel, together with business, social, medical or religious reasons (Stigter, 2004). However, only a small proportion of these circular or multidirectional migrants were considering migration to Europe: for most,
migration to Pakistan and Iran was a coping strategy to maintain assets, cover basic needs and repay debts through remittances (Ghobadi, Koettl, & Vakis, 2005; Stigter & Monsutt, 2005).

Less data is available regarding motivations of Pakistani migrants. The stakeholders surveyed mentioned general factors including security, livelihoods, educational opportunities (including a mismatch between relatively high levels of education and lack of relevant jobs), rising crime rates, natural disasters and rural to urban migration. One source attributes the spike in Pakistani arrivals in the EU in 2011 to the unprecedented flood disaster during the 2010 monsoon season. Interviews with immigrants and migrant associations in Greece including 30 Pakistanis and 30 Afghans found that generally economic factors were more prevalent for Pakistanis, while Afghans were motivated by a mixture of economic and conflict-related factors (Triandafyllidou, 2015). One quantitative study found that the larger the household, the greater the probability of migration, but that an increased number of dependents decreased the likelihood of having a migrant member. Additional factors including religious or ethnic discrimination or flight from ‘honour’-related violence could be observed, but further investigation into factors influencing Pakistani migrants’ decisions is required.

Reasons for leaving transit countries

Koser and Kuschminder (2016) differentiate between the decisions migrants make to leave their countries of origin and the decision migrants make about moving on from a transit country. While the decision to leave the country of origin is often made under stress and rather quickly, in transit countries, migrants have more time to create networks and find out more about potential destination countries. Furthermore, research has shown that the conditions migrants face in the transit countries have an influence on their further decision-making. Even though a country may have been intended as the final destination by a migrant but poor conditions or unrealised ambitions subsequently resulted in the desire to move onwards (Jordan & Düvell, 2002). Decisions are also quite likely to change based on policy interventions, if for instance immigration and asylum procedures become more rigid or more liberal (Koser & Kuschminder, 2016). Kuschminder and Siegel (2016) found in a study on Afghan migrants that reached their intended destination country, the Netherlands that the bad conditions in the transit countries, especially in Greece and Turkey since not many services are available for Afghans, lead most of them to move on as quickly as possible. Both countries do not process the asylum claims of Afghans, which incentivizes a fast moving on to a different European country. Time periods between 2 weeks up to a year were reported by respondents, depending on available resources and networks. In the case of Pakistani migrants, it more likely that they
stay in the transit country of Greece, due to preexisting networks in the country (Kushman, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015).

Culture of migration and other factors influencing the decision-making process

Factors that have an influence on an individual’s decision to migrate as a result of household, cultural or intergenerational dynamics have also been investigated in academic literature. In some parts of Afghanistan, migration is strongly linked to ideas of masculinity and ‘coming of age’, a spectacular gamble and attempt to overcome obstacles, thereby proving oneself to be man and able to provide for a family (Dimitriadi, 2013; Monsutti, 2007). Familial dynamics in Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan are mentioned by several sources as increasing the likelihood of a collective decision, itself connected to the availability of transnational networks (Ghobadi, Koettl, & Vakis, 2005; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014; DACAAR, 2015). Interestingly, collective decisions were found to be more prevalent in high migrant-sending areas as opposed to low migrant-sending areas, where the idea was more likely to be initiated by the migrant themselves (Echavez C. R., Bagaporo, Pilongo, & Azadmanesh, 2014). The impact of globalisation and consumerism, with the desire for status and commodities intertwined with the association of masculinity, may be another driving force. In environments in which money often equals power, emigration can hold the promise of purchasing or restoring masculine self-esteem in communities distorted by competition for status and power (Ahmad, 2013).

Sources generally agree regarding the importance of family or kinship linkages in motivating decisions to migrate, as well as influencing the choice of destination country and facilitating the migration itself. In one study, migration to Turkey as a potential ‘destination country’ was reported to be partially motivated by the ethnic affinity, particularly noted among Afghan Turkmen but also Uzbeks, Hazara and Tajiks (Alimia, 2014). Political, economic and educational links between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey promoted by all three governments may be further fuelling migration flows towards Turkey (ibid). Perceptions of Europe as a whole or of specific European countries are influential, including perceptions of freedom, respect for human rights, access to education, prosperous economic environment, ability to find employment and security (Kushman, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). However, it must be remembered that decisions are often made in stages, and evolve over time: many sources indicate that a general destination in ‘Europe’ may have been decided previous to the journey, and then redefined en route and in response to various factors. In-depth interviews with 43 refugees and asylum seekers in the UK found that less than one-third specifically wanted to come to the UK and in another study, three-quarters of respondents claimed that
they did not make the choice of their final destination country when leaving for Europe (Crawley, 2011; Rossi & Vitali, 2014).

Another factor recognised as being a significant foundation for migrant’s decision-makings are smuggling networks and their associated services. As Robinson and Segrott (2002) even put it - a migrant’s choice of destination country is often limited to those on offer by the used smuggler. As already pointed out, smugglers are in many cases the prime source of information access, therefore destination choices are not seldom based on information provided by smugglers.

The importance of capacities

An analysis of household data from Afghanistan in 2003 found that less poor households are more likely to migrate abroad whereas the poorest households are more likely to only migrate internally. External migrant households are more likely to have higher levels of literacy, asset and land ownership, and be living in rural areas rather than in urban areas (Ghobadi, Koettl, & Vakis, 2005). These findings were corroborated by another study examining the influence of vulnerability on migration intentions in Afghanistan: the most vulnerable households had a lower likelihood of concrete plans to migrate (Loschmann & Siegel, 2014). Various other migrants report the lack of education opportunities for either themselves or their children as a key consideration motivating migration. Similar outcomes, especially the fact that it is not the poorest proportion of the population migrating outside of Pakistan, can be observed in the case of Pakistan (Hasan & Raza, 2009). The decision to migrate is rather taken on a household level than on an individual level in the case of the Pakistani migrant population. Furthermore, looking at the economic background it is more likely that members of families from rural non-farm employment backgrounds take the step to migrate than those dependent on agricultural labour (ibid).
DATA GAPS – TA 6 DRIVERS OF MIGRATION AND DECISION MAKING

This thematic area is relatively well studied especially compared to other thematic areas with regard to the nationalities of interest, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, information is missing on how drivers of migration have changed over the years for Afghan and Pakistani migrants and how this is linked to historical and current migration patterns. Seeing the different historical phases in both countries and knowing that both countries have a long existing migration history it would be interesting to know how motivations have changed, as well as how they will change in the future. Another area that has not been widely explored is the hierarchy between different motivating factors, their complex interactions and how those affect decision making for out-migration. It is not clear when looking, for instance, at reports about migrant expectations of their new lives in the destination countries which of these expectations are more important than others, also comparing it amongst migrants characteristics for instance in terms of gender, age groups or education levels. Furthermore, not much research has been done in terms of penal data, tracking (forced) migrants over time and seeing if their perceptions on the drivers have changed since they have made their way to Europe (still in transit countries) or once they have made their way to Europe.

5.7 Thematic area 7: Role of the Diaspora (incl. remittances)

Due to the large Afghan and Pakistani diaspora in Europe, under this thematic area the desk review aimed to find data on the actual role the diaspora plays in decisions whether and where to migrate, while also exploring potential linkages of remittance usage to actual migration.
Diaspora

Both Afghans and Pakistanis have large diaspora groups in Europe and sources agree that the diaspora plays a significant role in migration towards Europe. Significant diaspora populations exist throughout Europe, including in the UK, Germany, Norway and other countries. In Germany, the Afghan diaspora has grown from 1,600 in 1978 to around 100,000-125,000, mostly located in Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main (Haque, 2012). Kinship links, whether of immediate family or wider community or ethnic links, are highly influential on the choice of specific destination countries and provide information on the journey and procedures. Ad-hoc profiling conducted among Afghans new arrivals in Greece in March 2016 found that 9 percent of new arrivals had used information from friends and family at their intended destination (JIPS, 2016).

Research concludes that many migrants anticipate support from diaspora networks, including possible sponsorship, temporary accommodation, access to employment and a community with shared cultural and social characteristics. Individuals within the diaspora clearly play a role as intermediaries, as several sources report that smuggling networks are organized along ethnic or nationality lines from place of origin to destination country (Frontex, 2015). This impact is increased in groups within which practices such as group endogamy or kinship marriage result in chain migration and family reunification (Ballard, 2001). It is clear that diaspora and the transnational networks that they belong to are a key source of social, cultural and potentially economic capital that lowers the cost and threshold for migration (Crisp, 1999). Quantitative data analysis of migration from 195 countries to 30 OECD countries in 1990 and 2010 found that ‘diaspora increase migration flows and lower their average educational level diasporas explain the majority of the variability of migration flows and selection’ (Beine, Docquier, & Özden, 2011).

Remittances

Compared to the clear evidence of the existence and importance of social and cultural capital on migration flows, evidence for the impact of economic capital from the diaspora in increasing migration flows is scarcer. Longitudinal research that explores the usage of received remittances amongst households in
Afghanistan and Pakistan for potential out-migration to Europe has not been identified. Most sources indicate that remittances are used as transient sources of revenue, to increase asset ownership and increase human capital (Ahmed, Mughal, & Klasen, 2016; Ahmed, 2015; Hagen-Zanker, et al., 2014; Ballard, 2003). However, sources linking remittances to potential future migration are rare. An ethnographic study of the transnational networks of the Hazara found that such networks are fuelled by globalised transportation, financial exchange and information system, constituting very efficient transnational migratory and trade networks (Monsutti, 2004). Another source reports empirical data suggesting that increases in remittances cause increases in migration, using evidence from a study of Turkish migration to Germany from 1964 to 2004 (Akkoyunlu & Siliverstovs, 2013). Information on formal remittance flows through the international banking system from Europe to Pakistan is available and captured by the state bank of Pakistan. This bank issues monthly data regarding remittances received, disaggregated by sending countries, including the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, Norway and Switzerland (State Bank of Pakistan, 2016). Twenty-five banks in Pakistan are members of the Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI), a public-private initiative aiming to facilitate the flow of remittances to Pakistan and modalities that include both cash transfers and transfers between accounts. Information on informal remittances flows through money transfer operators and money service providers are not included in the monthly reports, but are estimated at almost 40 percent of total flows (Amjad, Irfan, & Arif, 2013). Furthermore, less information is available on remittances transferred from Europe to Pakistan through the hawala system.

Afghan remittances flows are mainly of informal of nature and most transactions take place under the hawala system. Some research has mapped informal channels under the hawala system and their modus operandi but neither is the magnitude of monthly remittances from Europe to Afghanistan known nor is there concrete evidence to which extend remittances are used for migration to Europe (Ballard, 2006). As mentioned previously, systematic surveys regarding the financing of migrant journeys and specifically the contribution of the diaspora (incl. financial resources) have not been identified during this literature review.
5.8 Thematic area 8: Migrants’ perceptions towards Europe

Research activities for the eighth thematic area focused on data related to migrants’ perceptions of life in Europe and knowledge of procedures for obtaining refugee status, humanitarian protection or permission to stay (including access to livelihoods) in various European countries. In addition activities aimed at finding information on migrants’ intended countries of destination at departure and whether destination country preferences changed over time.

DATA GAPS – TA 7 ROLE OF THE DIASPORA (INCL. REMITTANCES)

Information regarding the actual diaspora of Afghans and Pakistanis in Europe is scattered. While there is quite extensive information on diaspora communities as well as on remittances flows in general, the connection between the two with regard to their impact on migration is not as much explored. Even though the data on Afghan and Pakistani diasporas throughout Europe is relatively well established insofar as knowing their size and where the largest communities are based, data on how much these diasporas actually incentivize further migration is not as extensive explored. Furthermore, there is almost no information on the profiles of these diaspora groups in terms of economic backgrounds, education or skills which most likely have an effect on the flow of remittances and how they are used in the target country. Remittances are also understudied, particularly in the case of Afghanistan where there is no accurate information on the flows and actual size of remittances due to the large informal sector. The hawala system is not studied to an extent which provides detailed information on the amounts that flow between the countries as well as for what they are used. For both countries the data on actual remittance usage by individuals and households is in many cases either outdated or underrepresented. Combined with the fact that data on the actual role of the diaspora in the decision whether and where to migrate is limited and potential linkages of remittance usage for actual migration is largely unexplored, making this field subject to potential future research.
Migrant’s perceptions before departure

Data collection amongst Afghans and Pakistani migrants that aim to migrate to Europe is almost non-existing and therefore data on the perceptions migrants have towards Europe is very limited. Research conducted by the Australian National University in 2014 amongst Afghan communities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran aimed to obtain information and tackle several of the questions under this thematic area, unfortunately the data has not yet been made public. More recently some NGOs aimed at collecting information amongst potential migrants and try to draw patterns. Most of this data-collection is still on going and no concrete outputs have been publicly shared yet. Most information that is available comes from migrants en route or at the ‘destination’ countries, which may have a significant degree of recall and selection bias.

Interviews with Pakistanis and Afghans in Greece established that they had some information about their intended destination country and asylum/legalisation processes (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Two studies involving interviews in the UK, on the other hand, found that very few had any detailed or meaningful knowledge of the UK asylum system, particularly among unaccompanied minors (Gilbert & Koser, 2006; Crawley, 2011). The majority had no knowledge of welfare benefits and support, and erroneously believed that they would have the right and access to employment to support themselves and their families. Among those who knew about the UK, perceptions were limited to football, respect for human rights, perceived independence of the judiciary and systems of law and order (ibid).

The stakeholders surveyed in Afghanistan reported that migrants have misconceptions about life in Europe and their access to services. They reported unrealistically high expectations regarding ease of access to income-generating activities, and a lack of information regarding international protection and asylum application processes. Several sources indicated that Afghan migrants expect the same access to asylum as Syrian refugees, viewing their situations and risks faced as similar. Frontex (2016a) reports a variance in the information sources and negotiating power between different nationalities: Syrians are better informed via social media regarding smuggling costs and therefore have a base for negotiating, whereas Afghan and Pakistani nationals have often already negotiated the price in their country of origin or departure.
Sources of information

With regard to information sources, a profiling of Afghan new arrivals in 2016 found that the most important sources for migrants were smugglers (81%), travel companions (14%), friends and family in the destination country (9%). The importance of the social networks with the diaspora and transnational communities has also been mentioned and is confirmed by numerous sources: those with access to networks and information are in a better place to negotiate their entry and conditions (Crisp, 1999). McGregor and Siegel (2014) also stress that social media has an impact on the incentive to migrate since social media is often used to inform migrants on potential destination countries. This argument is also supported for the target population of Afghan migrants in the sense that a significant amount receive their information on migration opportunities and challenges through social media (Arjomand, 2016). The role of social media on the decision to migrate is less extensively studied for the group of Pakistani migrants.

Several studies have examined the role of information technology in particular mobile phones and social media in assisting the migration trajectory and providing information (Gillespie, et al., 2016). One found four functions of social media: (i) enhancing and maintaining strong ties with family and friends; (ii) used to address weak ties and linkages in organising process of migration and integration; (iii) used to establish new infrastructure consisting of latent ties; and (iv) offering a rich, discrete and unofficial source of insider knowledge on migration (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014). Another study details the practical assistance available for potential migrants and migrants en route from Facebook groups, Whatsapp groups and messages, Google Maps, GPS capabilities on mobile phones, Twitter and specialised apps, while also documenting the risks of misinformation and exploitation from such technology (Frouws et al, 2016). Only 8 percent mentioned social media, 6 percent specialized websites and 4 percent mobile apps. These numbers indicate that at least for the Afghan migrant population, reports pointing out the importance of social media and messaging services may be exaggerated, and may also be reinforcing the importance of the role of the smuggler as an information source (JIPS, 2016).

Several sources documented instances of misinformation given to migrants by the smuggler or travelling companions, which contributed to the rejection of asylum applications or apprehension by officials (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2016). In depth interviews conducted with family members in Afghanistan of migrants in Europe shed some light on the variance between actual experience and expectations before travelling, although the source also notes the risk of bias from family dynamics and retrospective reflection. On the other hand, some sources found that the knowledge of risks and knowing that there is a potential
for failure may be higher than often suspected, which highlights the importance of viewing risk assessment from the perspective of the migrant, who may judge – in a nuanced manner - that threats to the goal of long term safety are less significant than risks to immediate safety (Townsend & Oomen, 2015; Hagen-Zanker, et al., 2014).

**DATA GAPS – TA 8 MIGRANTS’ PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS EUROPE**

This thematic area is understudied and despite more recent initiatives to collect data mainly amongst Afghan (potential) migrants, lacks concrete evidence. Most of the research in this area concentrates on those en route or those who have already reached their destination country. Research is needed to fill gaps and to understand what knowledge Afghan and Pakistani migrants have about potential risks, but also what expectations migrants have about the route to Europe and their lives in Europe, as well as the extent to which smugglers and human traffickers are intentionally misrepresented opportunities in Europe in order to market their services. With the help of panel data research the development of expectations and perceptions could be explored. This approach would eliminate the bias often faced when collecting data of those en route, because their perceptions and expectations have, most likely, already been influenced in a similar way to which the expectations of migrants that have reached the destination country have. Collecting data on potential migrants and then tracking them once en route or upon arrival in the destination country would provide important information on if and how perceptions and expectations have changed through the journey. The problem with the data collection on the expectations of migrants is, as with many of the other thematic areas, also the constant changing nature of this field. Therefore, a lot of the data that is currently available cannot be applied to current flows anymore due to factors such as increased use of the internet, social media etc. which makes migrants today often better informed than migrants that have left their country in the past.
CONCLUSIONS
6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In line with the thematic areas, information and data collected under the literature review reveal that various data-gaps are more significant than others, this leads to the conclusion that;

THEMATIC AREAS

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TA 1) The trend to have a better idea and understanding of migrants’ characteristics has been increasing recently. Even though efforts have been made, **current existing data is often not representative for the larger majority of a nationality as well as existing data often lacks variables that are able to tell much about the demographics and especially the social features of those migrants.** In terms of understanding the origins of Afghans and Pakistani that make their way to Europe, another gap that has been identified is **the starting point of the migrant’s journey and where migrants have resided during the last year(s) before departure.**

TA 2) Information is available on migratory routes, Afghan and Pakistani migrants use from Turkey to and through Europe, however **significant data gaps exist on actual departure points and routes used within the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iranian territories; as well as concrete data on which regions and/or communities have the largest out-migration flows.** The complexities of migration journeys is generally not captured in the data – the general routes are most often described as linear and continuous, **without understanding the multi-directional nature of migrants’ journeys or fully capturing the extent of transit periods, circular migration, and repeated or failed attempts to cross borders.**
TA 3) While there is quite some ad hoc information from various sources, **systematic studies that focus on the means and modalities of financing migrant journeys to Europe are missing**. Information is often scattered making it very difficult to get a complete picture of how journeys are financed. Furthermore, in the case of Afghan and Pakistani migrants on their way to Europe **data is missing in terms of social and cultural capital used when financing their journeys** since most emphasis has been put on the factor of economic capital (i.e. prior income, savings, debts, taking loans etc.).

TA 4) Information on what role intermediaries play in facilitating the journeys of Afghan and Pakistani migrants and **how their networks operate is anecdotal and very limited**. The informal nature of the intermediary’s practices are the reason that international organizations and researchers have not been able to capture in-depth data. The fast changing nature of smugglers, their networks and their routes makes it hard to generalize from certain results to another context. Recently more information is available on how migrants access intermediaries, nevertheless **no concrete and representable evidence is available on the actual numbers** in the sense of reporting how many and of which nationalities migrants make use of smuggling networks.

TA 5) Information on **what risk and vulnerabilities migrants face along the journey is scarce for certain fields**, is anecdotal and often based upon informal incident reports from humanitarian actors. **Especially with regard to abuse migrants experience en route, valid data is missing and should be improved**. Various sources have tried to capture information from migrants on what risks and vulnerabilities they faced during their journeys and how they mitigate for those risks. Much of this information is not public and not captured in representative data-sets for actual analysis. While the data on vulnerabilities faced during the journey and in transit countries is starting to become more extensive **less attention is being paid to risks and vulnerabilities migrants potentially face in the destination countries**.
TA 6) Data on the drivers of migration and migrants’ decision making is quite extensive for the nationalities of interest, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, despite the lengthy history of migration from these two nations there is no panel data available, giving an insight into the changes in motivations and drivers over time. Furthermore, another area that has not been widely explored is the hierarchy between different motivating factors, their complex interactions and how those affect decision making for out-migration.

TA 7) Information on how migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan finance their journey is captured by different sources. The topic that is understudied is the role that the Afghan and Pakistani diaspora plays in financing the journeys and their influence on a migrant’s decision where to migrate. The informal nature of remittance sending practices from and especially to Afghanistan makes it difficult to identify those linkages, in addition to the demographic characteristics of the Afghan and Pakistani diaspora in Europe as well as their linkages to their respective home-countries has not been widely mapped. Since there is no concrete data on the actual size of remittances as well as the accurate use of remittances, there is no reliable data that can establish the link between the diaspora and if their remittances incentivise further migration.

TA 8) Information on the perceptions migrants have of life in Europe and the actual procedures involved to obtain refugee status has not been extensively studied and the information that is scarcely available is anecdotal and lacks concrete evidence. Most of the research in this area concentrates on those en route or those who have already reached their destination country. This information has the potential to be biased since migrants have already experienced certain events and, in addition, their knowledge might have already have been broadened. Research is needed to fill gaps and to understand what knowledge Afghan and Pakistani migrants have about potential risks, but also what expectations migrants have about their lives in Europe, as well as the extent to which smugglers and human traffickers are intentionally misrepresenting opportunities in Europe in order to market their services.
Despite the fact that more data is available for various thematic areas than others it must be concluded that there is a great lack of data-collection and studies that aim to **collect all data at one point in time under one exercises**. Currently data to answer the core research questions are captured by different sources at different points in time. In order to make a structured comparative analysis IOM believes that an activity that aims to **capture all data in one time-bounded exercise is of great importance**.

It is therefore that under the following phase of this DTM project, IOM will aim to further build upon the existing DTM structure in Europe to further extend available data on the outlined thematic areas and further ensure that ‘missing’ data for other thematic areas is better explored and captured whenever possible.
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